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I. INTRODUCTION 
From its earliest days, the Endangered Species Act (“ESA” or 
“Act”) has been a powerful law.  Since Chief Justice Warren Burger 
explained that the “plain intent of Congress in enacting this statute 
was to halt and reverse the trend towards species extinction, 
whatever the cost,”1 the ESA has become the “pit bull” of 
environmental statutes2 or the “workhorse of species protection.”3  
Thanks to the Act’s broad enforcement power and citizen suit 
provision,4 the federal government and environmental groups have 
deployed the ESA against a wide variety of industry actors—from 
property developers, to agricultural producers, to wind and solar 
energy companies.5  Tacitly acknowledging the strength and reach 
of the ESA, regulated entities and property-rights groups have 
engaged in a multi-decade pitched battle to destroy, or at least 
weaken, the Act.6  Because the ESA reflects the “congressional 
 
1.  Tenn. Valley Auth. (TVA) v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 184 (1978).  See id. at 194 (“[C]ongress 
intended endangered species to be afforded the highest of priorities.”). 
2.  See, e.g., Steven P. Quarles, The Pit Bull Goes to School, 15 ENVTL. F. 55, 55 (1998) 
(describing origin and history of the “pit bull” term); see also Joe Mann, Note, Making Sense of 
the Endangered Species Act: A Human-Centered Justification, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 246, 250 (1999) 
(“In all of American environmental law, one would be hard-pressed to find another piece of 
legislation that establishes such an inflexible prioritization scheme as the ESA.”). 
3.  J.B. Ruhl, Keeping the Endangered Species Act Relevant, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 275, 
277 (2009). 
4.  16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2018). 
5.  E.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995) 
(challenge by “[s]mall landowners, logging companies, and families dependent on the forest 
products industries” fearing ESA’s reach); N.M. Cattle Growers Ass’n v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife 
Serv. (FWS), 248 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2001) (challenge by “elements of New Mexico’s 
agricultural industry,” claiming impact from the FWS’s designation of the Southwestern 
Willow Flycatcher’s critical habitat under the ESA); Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge 
Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540 (D. Md. 2009) (ESA citizen suit lawsuit to enjoin operation 
of wind farm). 
6.  The battle to degrade and destroy the ESA occurs along (at least) three fronts.  First, 
industry and property-right groups have challenged both the constitutionality of the statute 
itself and the validity of FWS regulations in court; they have had more success with the latter 
challenges. Compare Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997), 
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intent to tilt the balance in any dispute involving an endangered 
species towards species protection,”7 even congressional 
Republicans are getting in on the Act—for the unusual end of 
combating the Obama administration’s climate change rules.8 
Despite the “pit bull” nature of the ESA and its purpose of 
protecting nonhuman species, one category of interest groups has, 
until recently, deployed a remarkably limited use of the Act:  
animal rights advocates.  The animal rights movement’s reluctance 
to embrace the ESA is not by accident.  It likely stems from the 
statute’s location at the nexus of what the philosopher Bryan 
Norton describes as “two moral systems—intergenerational 
sustainability of natural processes and concern for the wellbeing 
and autonomy of individual animals.”9  These “moral systems” are 
not always complementary.10  Under the traditional view of the 
ESA, the statute resolves the conflicting moral systems in favor of 
 
cert. denied, 524 U.S. 937 (1998) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge to ESA), and San Luis 
& Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 638 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2011) with N.M. Cattle 
Growers Ass’n, 248 F.3d 1277 (rejecting FWS’s baseline model for designating critical habitat 
for Southwestern Willow Flycatcher).  Second, the same groups have petitioned the ESA’s 
implementing agencies—FWS and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS”)—to 
remove ESA protections for numerous species via “delisting.”  See, e.g., Removing Oenothera 
avita ssp. eurekensis and Swallenia alexandrae From the Federal List of Endangered and 
Threatened Plants, 79 Fed. Reg. 11,053, 11,055 (Feb. 27, 2014) (proposing delisting in 
response to petition from Pacific Legal Foundation).  Third, when the implementing 
agencies and courts will not relieve ESA regulatory pressure, the regulated industry, property 
rights groups, and even states have sought to persuade Congress to exempt species from ESA 
protections.  See, e.g., Edward A. Fitzgerald, Alliance for Wild Rockies v. Salazar:  Congress 
Behaving Badly, 25 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 351, 370-72 (describing “wolf hysteria” leading to 
congressional delisting of the Northern Rocky Mountain distinct population segment of the 
gray wolf). 
7.  Hope M. Babcock, The Sad Story of the Northern Rocky Mountain Gray Wolf Reintroduction 
Program, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 25, 31 (2013) (emphasis added) (citing TVA v. Hill, 437 
U.S. 153, 185 (1978)). 
8.  See Jeremy P. Jacobs & Corbin Hiar, ESA emerges as weapon for enemies of environmental 
rules, GREENWIRE (June 26, 2015), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060020977 
[https://perma.cc/BSU9-6HCF] (describing “attempts to undercut U.S. EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan by claiming the Obama administration failed to carefully weigh the impact of forcing 
the closure of coal-fired power plants on endangered Florida manatees,” who enjoy water 
warmed from power plant discharges). 
9.  Bryan Norton, Caring for Nature:  A Broader Look at Animal Stewardship, in ETHICS ON 
THE ARK:  ZOOS, ANIMAL WELFARE, AND WILDLIFE CONSERVATION 375, 384 (Norton et al. eds., 
1995). 
10.  The distinction between the two moral systems crystallizes in the context of zoos:  “At 
times, actions designed to benefit populations will conflict with the interests of individual 
animals held in captivity.”  Irus Braverman, Captive for Life, in THE ETHICS OF CAPTIVITY 193, 
203 (Lori Gruen ed., 2014) (citing Wuichet & Norton, Differing Conceptions of Animal Welfare, 
in ETHICS ON THE ARK 232–52 (Norton et al. eds., 1995)). 
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“intergenerational sustainability”—in short, when we set the species 
against the individual, the species always wins.  This conception 
limits the statute’s value for animal rights. 
This Article challenges the traditional conception that the ESA 
offers little to individual animals and animal rights.  Instead, the 
Article suggests that the Act provides rights and welfare protections 
for individual members of endangered species at the experience level 
of the individual animal.  In enacting the ESA, Congress concerned 
itself with the individual experience of members of endangered 
species—and the ESA’s implementing agencies, U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and the National Marine Fisheries Service 
(“NMFS”), have worked to promote such experience.  In other 
words, the Act does not just protect a species as a collective entity, 
but also pays attention to the rights of the individual, so long as 
that individual is a member of a covered class. 
In the past, most scholars who have identified a statutory tension 
between intergenerational sustainability and individual animal 
interests then interpret that tension to mean the ESA lacks 
protections for the individual.  Taimie Bryant points to the ESA as 
an example when she argues that environmental law is “blind to 
the uniqueness and value of animals.”11  According to Bryant, while 
“the ESA does contain certain preconditions for animal rights, such 
as species protection and protection of habitat,” the statute “is 
quite limited in what it can accomplish for individual animals.”12  
Contrasting the ESA with a statute providing direct rights to 
individual animals, Adam Kolber contends that “the protection of 
endangered species as such does not provide for direct duties to 
animals. . . . Distinctly lacking from direct consideration, however, 
are the animals themselves.  At best, the Endangered Species Act 
provides for direct duties to animal species.”13  This assumption, that 
the sole protection inherent in the ESA “is protection from 
extinction as a species,”14 appears to motivate Jeff Leslie and Cass 
 
11.  Taimie L. Bryant, Animals Unmodified:  Defining Animals/Defining Human Obligations to 
Animals, 2006 U. CHICAGO LEGAL F. 137, 170 (2006). 
12.  Id. at 171; see also Ani B. Satz, Animals as Vulnerable Subjects:  Beyond Interest-Convergence, 
Hierarchy, and Property, 16 ANIMAL L. 65, 108–09 (2009) (“[T]he obvious limitation is that the 
ESA and other wildlife statutes do not speak to individual animals who may need protection.  
They do, however, embrace the intrinsic value of animals . . . .”). 
13.  Adam Kolber, Note, Standing Upright:  The Moral and Legal Standing of Humans and 
Other Apes, 54 STAN. L. REV. 163, 177 (2001). 
14.  Bryant, supra note 11, at 171; see also Federico Cheever & Michael Balster, The Taking 
Prohibition in Section 9 of the Endangered Species Act:  Contradictions, Ugly Ducklings, and 
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Sunstein in their proposal to incorporate ESA concepts regarding 
species into new legislation eliminating individual animal 
suffering.15 
Similarly, multiple scholars argue that the ESA exhibits a human-
oriented desire to protect species, not individuals:  “The ESA and 
the [Marine Mammal Protection Act] are essentially wildlife 
management statutes that seek to conserve nature’s diversity with 
an eye towards man’s long-term interests.”16  Starting from such an 
anthropocentric position, these scholars contend, the interests of 
ESA-covered individual animals are always subservient to human 
interests.  Ani Satz, thus, describes how, in Alaska, “gray wolves, who 
are protected as either endangered or threatened in other areas of 
the country, are unprotected and subject to aerial shooting.”17 
Courts also fall in line with the traditional view that the ESA 
protects species instead of individual animal interests.  For 
example, in In Defense of Animals v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo, animal 
rights plaintiffs challenged “the proposed move of Timmy, a 
lowland gorilla, from the Cleveland Metroparks Zoo to the Bronx 
Zoo in New York for the purposes of mating Timmy with female 
gorillas.”18  Responding to the plaintiffs’ claim that “moving Timmy 
will result in needless pain and risk to Timmy, who is an 
 
Conservation of Species, 34 ENVTL. L. 363, 366–68 (2004) (arguing that even Section 9’s 
individual take prohibition must be understood “as an instrument to achieve the statute’s 
goal of species conservation”); Robert W. Adler, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: 
Environmental Science in Environmental Law, 27 VT. L. REV. 249, 297 n.38 (2003) (“The statute 
is designed to protect species and populations, and to protect individuals only as a means to 
that end.  Stated differently, it is a species protection law, not an animal rights statute.”). 
15.  Jeff Leslie & Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Rights Without Controversy, 70 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 117, 137 (2007) (“[T]hose concerned about animal suffering will challenge the idea 
that the protection of animals should depend on how much human beings are willing to pay 
to reduce that suffering. . . . The Endangered Species Act does not protect endangered 
species only to the extent that consumers are willing to pay enough to ensure their 
protection.  If animal suffering is an independent concern––and our argument suggests that 
it is––then a market in such suffering seems wholly inadequate, perhaps even a kind of 
joke.”). 
16.  David R. Schmahmann & Lori J. Polacheck, The Case Against Rights for Animals, 22 
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 747, 768 (1995); id. at 769-70 (“Neither the ESA nor the MMPA is 
rooted in a concern for the rights––or even the interests––of the affected animals 
themselves.  Rather, by promoting species conservation, the statutes aim to maintain 
ecological diversity for the benefit of people.”). 
17.  Satz, supra note 12, at 88–89 (contending that the ESA arose from “[i]nterest-
convergence in the sense that humans benefit from wild animals who inform scientific 
inquiry and are aesthetically appreciated”). 
18.  In Def. of Animals v. Cleveland Metroparks Zoo, 785 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 
1991). 
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endangered species,”19 the court held that “plaintiffs have not even 
alleged, nor could they allege, that some provision of the [ESA] 
would be violated by the transportation of Timmy to New York.”20  
Schmahmann and Polacheck interpret the district court’s holding 
to reject ESA provision of individual-level protections:  “The court’s 
holding clearly reflected the view that the ESA’s purpose is to 
preserve and propagate endangered species, not to protect the 
‘feelings’ of individual animals.”21 
A court’s assumption that the ESA is a species-oriented, and not 
individual-oriented, statute is often evident in the context of 
judicial relief.22  Many courts require that plaintiffs show species-
level impacts to satisfy irreparable harm when seeking a 
preliminary injunction.23  In a representative decision, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Montana explained that, in order 
to show sufficient irreparable harm, the “alleged harm to the 
plaintiff must be anchored in a specific and detailed allegation of 
harm to a particular species or critical habitat.”24 
 
19.  Id. 
20.  Id. at 103 (holding that because plaintiffs failed to file a 60-day notice letter, their 
claim did not meet the ESA’s jurisdictional requirements).  
21.  Schmahmann & Polacheck, supra note 16, at 770.  Contrary to their description of 
the case, the ESA does in fact regulate individual animals’ “feelings,” by cross-referencing the 
Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) and its vocabulary of psychological well-being.  See infra Section 
III.B.3.  Moreover, the Cleveland Metroparks Zoo court’s determination that plaintiffs could not 
possibly allege a violation of the ESA premised on the transportation of a member of an 
endangered species, 785 F. Supp. at 103, is called into question by a federal district court 
decision finding a likelihood of success on that very theory.  See Elephant Justice Proj. v. 
Woodland Park Zoological Soc’y, No. C15-0451-JCC, 2015 WL 12564233 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 
2015) (denying preliminary injunction but finding plaintiff “likely to prevail on its argument 
that the transfer [of two endangered elephants] is ‘commercial activity’ within the meaning 
of the ESA [and] . . . . a permit is required because the transport will constitute an ‘unlawful 
take’ of an endangered species”). 
22.  See, e.g., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 623 F.3d 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2010) (finding that 
even if prohibiting “take” of endangered species applies to individual animals, the question 
of what violates the ESA does not equate to “the appropriate remedy for a violation”). 
23.  See Danny Lutz, Harming the Tinkerer:  The Case for Aligning Standing and Preliminary 
Injunction Analysis in the Endangered Species Act, 20 ANIMAL L. REV. 311, 335–38 nn.169–183 & 
accompanying text (2014) (describing how courts generally apply the species-level effects 
test as the irreparable harm standard in ESA cases). 
24.  Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Kruger, 35 F. Supp. 3d 1259, 1269 (D. Mont. 2014).  
But see Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Kempthorne, 481 F. Supp. 2d 53, 69 (D.D.C. 2006) (“The 
Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ contention that ‘requiring Plaintiffs to show jeopardy to the 
existence of a species in order to secure injunctive relief would stand the ESA on its head.  
Without the ability to enjoin illegal taking under the ESA, courts would be without power to 
prevent harm to endangered species before a species was on the brink of extinction.’”), 
vacated as moot, 527 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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Indeed, the few voices that do claim the ESA is an animal-
centered, rights-based statute are those complaining about the 
statute’s overreach.  For example, a pamphlet titled “Animal and 
Ecological Terrorism in America” includes the enactment of the 
ESA in its timeline of events led by animal activists “hell-bent on 
revolutionizing a system of perceived abuse.”25  Less caustically, 
Charles Mann and Mark Plummer argue in their book, Noah’s 
Choice, that reverence for endangered animals “above all else” is “a 
position that has been adopted, largely intact, in the Endangered 
Species Act.”26  Mann and Plummer then complain that the Act 
allows “concern for the environment to destroy someone’s 
aspirations to educate their children, or to provide good health 
care for their family, or to live in a safe, comfortable home.”27  The 
authors then propose amendments to the Act that “admit the 
values of both economics and ecology.”28 
The ingrained, traditional belief that the ESA prioritizes a human 
interest in intergenerational sustainability over individual animal 
interests aligns with the current perception of the Act’s purpose.  
To many, the ESA ensures that species continue to exist for the 
direct human benefits of “dinner, diversion, and drugs.”29  As 
biologist E.O. Wilson told the U.S. Senate in a hearing discussing 
the Act: 
 
The honeybee is like a magic well.  The more you draw from it, the 
more there is to draw.  And so it is with any species, which is a unique 
configuration of genes assembled over thousands of years, possessing 
its own biology, mysteries, and still untested uses for mankind.30 
 
 
25.  See Andrew Ireland Moore, Comment, Caging Animal Advocates’ Freedoms: The 
Unconstitutionality of the Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act, 11 ANIMAL L. REV. 255, 259 (2005).   
26.  CHARLES C. MANN & MARK PLUMMER, NOAH’S CHOICE:  THE FUTURE OF ENDANGERED 
SPECIES 25 (1995). 
27.  Id. at 143. 
28.  Id. at 145.  In a subsequent book review in the Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 
Mann and Plummer’s proposed amendments are criticized as a view that “rings of elitism” 
and considers “[o]nly the value humans place on threatened or endangered species, which 
by definition most people will rarely encounter in their daily lives.  Those with the most at 
stake––the species themselves––are not acknowledged or represented.”  Deborah Eudene, 
Book Note, Noah’s Choice:  The Future of Endangered Species, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 233, 238 
(1996).  This criticism has its own familiar ring.  It could also be levied against the traditional 
conception of the ESA.   
29.  See MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 26, at 122.   
30.  Toward a Lasting Conservation Ethic:  Hearing on the Endangered Species Act Before the 
Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution, 97th Cong. (1981) (statement of E.O. Wilson).  
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Others view the ESA as protecting “existence values” beyond the 
direct economic benefit for humans, yet these existence values are 
still outside the ambit of animal interests.31  This desire for an 
ongoing assurance that other species remain in existence is a 
“reason peculiarly our own”—i.e., a human-centered desire.32  
Humans alone can bewail the fate of the passenger pigeon, Aldo 
Leopold writes.33 
With a human-centered, species-oriented purpose in mind, the 
traditional conception of the ESA contends that the Act’s 
protections exist, at most, to recover a species.  The statute’s 
operative provisions are, therefore, a means to an end—methods 
“necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species 
to the point at which the measures provided pursuant to this Act 
are no longer necessary,”34 and nothing more.  The focus on 
recovery means that once FWS or NMFS lists a species, the ESA 
only succeeds by returning the species population to a level 
sufficient for delisting.  On that score the ESA is failing.35 
 
31.  119 CONG. REC. 30,162 (1973) (Statement of Rep. Leonor Sullivan) (“When we 
threaten endangered species, we tinker with our own future.  We run risks whose magnitudes 
we understand dimly, if at all.”).  
32.  Robert Porter Allen, THE WHOOPING CRANE, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 3 OF THE 
NATIONAL AUDUBON SOC’Y 204 (1952) (We “[h]ave singled out the Whooping Crane for 
survival for reasons that are peculiarly our own, in the face of possibility that Nature had 
already greased the skids to its ultimate destruction.”). 
33.  ALDO LEOPOLD, On a Monument to a Pigeon, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC:  AND 
SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 108–112 (1968); see also Elizabeth Kolbert, THE SIXTH 
EXTINCTION:  AN UNNATURAL HISTORY 261 (2014) (“Time and time again, people have 
demonstrated that they care about what Rachel Carson called ‘the problem of sharing our 
earth with other creatures,’ and they’re willing to make sacrifices on those creatures’ 
behalf.”). 
34.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (2018) (defining “conserve,” which is central to the “purposes” 
subsection of Congress’s declaration of the purposes and policy of the ESA); see also Katrina 
M. Wyman, Protecting Ecosystems on Land:  Rethinking the ESA to Reflect Human Dominion over 
Nature, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 490, 494 (2008) (“Under the Act, conservation is defined not 
merely as ensuring the survival of species but more ambitiously as recovering species’ 
populations to enable them to exist without the safeguards provided by the ESA.”). 
35.  See Wyman, supra note 34, at 495 (explaining that “the Act rarely leads to the recovery 
of species,” which “call[s] into question the feasibility of the ESA’s stated objective of 
recovering all imperiled species to the point that they no longer require the Act’s 
protections.”).  Representative Rob Bishop used the ESA to challenge the Obama 
administration’s climate change actions, analogized baseball to describe the ESA’s recovery 
accomplishments:  “[T]he worst major league player we have ever had in history hit .185.  
The Endangered Species Act batting average would be .010 if you round it up.  They have 
had 1,500 species list, only 12 have actually passed the test and been recovered.”  160 CONG. 
REC. H6990 (2014) (statement of Rep. Rob Bishop).  Therefore, Bishop concluded, “The 
Endangered Species Act, quite frankly, is the most ineffective and inefficient piece of 
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Yet the traditional assumption that the ESA promotes 
“intergenerational sustainability” over individual animal interests 
and works towards the sole purpose of species recovery does not 
account for how the Act should and does often operate.  In many 
circumstances, the ESA protects individual members of listed 
species, even when those individuals offer no reproductive benefit 
or other assistance to the continuing survival of the species.  For 
example, the ESA protects captive members of an endangered 
species despite the “anomaly of identifying the physical and 
biological features that would be essential to the conservation of a 
species consisting entirely of captive animals in an artificial 
environment.”36  In February 2015, NMFS finalized the listing of 
just one animal, a Southern Resident Killer Whale named Lolita 
living alone in captivity in a tank in Miami.37  Lolita’s listing will not 
further the intergenerational sustainability of her species—but she 
now receives all the protections afforded in the Act.38  Many of 
those substantive protections exist to improve the quality of life of 
the individual members of listed species, and are unrelated to 
ensuring that the animals successfully reproduce. 
In this sense, advocates and scholars who view the ESA through 
the lens of intergenerational sustainability and “ecological holism” 
begin to look much like the “embarrassed” “left” in Sanford 
Levinson’s famous 1989 article on the Second Amendment.39  A 
view of the Act that includes more rights for individual members of 
 
legislation that we have in the history of this country.  It does not work.  It does not meet its 
goals.” Id. 
36.  Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Listing All Chimpanzees as 
Endangered, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,201, 35,207–08 (proposed June 12, 2013).   
37.  Final Amendment to the Endangered Species Act Listing of the Southern Resident 
Killer Whale Distinct Population Segment, 80 Fed. Reg. 7,380 (Feb. 10, 2015) (to be codified 
at 50 C.F.R pt. 224) [hereinafter Lolita Listing Final Rule]. 
38.  Id. at 7,385 (“[C]aptive members of a species have the same legal status as the species 
as a whole . . . [and] are also subject to the relevant provisions of section 9 of the ESA as 
warranted.”). 
39.  See Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 642 
(1989).  Levinson explained this form of “embarrassment” as stemming from scholars 
reading an otherwise-adored text in a way that undermines the scholars’ policy interests:  “I 
cannot help but suspect that the best explanation for the absence of the Second Amendment 
from the legal consciousness of the elite bar, including that component found in the legal 
academy, is derived from a mixture of sheer opposition to the idea of private ownership of 
guns and the perhaps subconscious fear that altogether plausible, perhaps even ‘winning,’ 
interpretations of the Second Amendment would present real hurdles to those of us 
supporting prohibitory regulation.” Id; see also infra Section II(A)(3), for a more detailed 
description of Levinson’s work and its influence. 
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protected species risks placing environmentalists in an 
uncomfortable position.  Animal rights advocates are often a 
disfavored group in legal and political arenas,40 and their embrace 
of existing laws can catalyze legislatures to scale back protections.41  
What if the ESA—or at least certain provisions of it—reveals itself 
to be an animal rights statute?42 
The Article begins in Part II with a brief philosophical 
background on two rights distinctions:  human and animal rights, 
and collective and individual rights.  The human rights discussion 
offers a very short description of the historical arc of rights in 
western political and legal theory, which started with a focus on the 
individual and has expanded to include collective, or group, rights.  
It also includes a counter-narrative outlier in the American 
constitutional context:  the Second Amendment’s movement from 
a collective to an individual right to bear arms.  Part II ends with a 
discussion of the individual and collective rights distinction within 
animal rights.  In Part III, this Article proposes that the classical 
conception of the ESA is limited—like the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent interpretation of the Second Amendment, the Act is 
embedded with individual rights and protections.  The Act’s text, 
purpose, and legislative history all suggest that members of ESA-
listed species receive physical, psychological, and other experience-
level protections as individuals.  The Article concludes, in Part IV, 
with two suggestions for regulatory reform and additional 
scholarship based on this new understanding of the ESA. 
 
40.  See, e.g., Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1210–11 (D. Idaho 
2015) (finding that, based on “[a]bundant evidence that [an Idaho state law criminalizing 
interference with agricultural operations] was enacted with the discriminatory purpose of 
silencing animal rights activists,” the law was unconstitutionally “animated by an improper 
animus toward animal welfare groups.”). 
41.  See, e.g., Mark Barrett, PETA Sues North Carolina Over ‘possum Drop Law, ASHEVILLE 
CITIZEN-TIMES (Jun. 12, 2015), http://www.citizen-times.com/story/news/local/ 
2015/06/12/peta-sues-north-carolina-new-possum-drop-law/71146858/ [https://perma.cc/ 
5NFY-HLHK] (explaining how, after PETA successfully blocked a North Carolina town from 
engaging in an annual New Year’s Eve tradition of lowering an opossum in a clear plastic 
box, the North Carolina legislature passed “by wide margins” a law that says North Carolina 
wildlife laws will not apply to opossums each year between December 29 and January 2). 
42.  See TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 362 (1983) (“Because paradigmatic 
rights-holders are individuals, and because the dominant thrust of contemporary 
environmental efforts (e.g., wilderness preservation) is to focus on the whole rather than on 
the part (i.e., the individual), there is an understandable reluctance on the part of 
environmentalists to ‘take rights seriously,’ or at least a reluctance to take them as seriously 
as the rights view contends we should.”). 
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II. PHILOSOPHICAL BACKDROP 
In Western political and legal theory, individual rights “derives in 
large part from the Kantian notion of the individual,” i.e., one who 
is “sovereign in terms of his/her ability to make choices.”43  All 
group rights theories, in contrast, begin with a different subject of 
concern:  “a right is a group right only if it is a right held by a 
group rather than by its members severally.”44 
The following subsections flesh out individual and collective 
rights.  But a quick word on what the two categories of rights have 
in common:  for each type of right, the claim for its recognition is 
at its zenith when the right is implicated in the survival of the entity 
asserting the right.  Thus, the Declaration of Independence 
includes as first among “unalienable rights” for human beings, the 
right to “life.”45  And “when the exercise of a group right is 
implicated in that group’s survival, and the right cannot be 
adequately protected in an individual rights context, there exists a 
particularly strong claim for its recognition as a group right.”46 
 
43.  Terence Dougherty, Group Rights to Cultural Survival:  Intellectual Property Rights in 
Native American Cultural Symbols, 29 COLUM. HUMAN RTS L. REV. 355, 356–57 (1998) (citing 
M.M. Slaughter, The Multicultural Self:  Questions of Subjectivity, Questions of Power, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE AND LEGITIMACY 369, 371 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 
1994)).  These Kantian origins suggested that individual rights are exclusive to humans. 
However, Kennan Ferguson challenges Kant’s view that “all politics [is] anthropolitics.”  See 
Kennan Ferguson, What Was Politics to the Denisovan?, 42 POL. THEORY 167 (2014).  Ferguson 
points to recent discoveries that hominins (e.g., Neanderthals and other prehistorical 
humans) used tools and created art—two widely used metrics widely used to “to distinguish 
human transcendence”—to describe “the difficulty in delineating the precise beginnings of 
politics and who participates in it.”  Id. at 174–75.  And if the line blurs with hominins, 
should it not also remain blurry with elephants, who mourn their dead, and orcas, who live 
in groups with their own dialects?   
44.  Peter Jones, Group Rights and Group Oppression, 7 J. POL. PHIL. 353, 354 (1999); see id. 
at 355 (“A group right is defined by its subject rather than its object:  by who it is that holds 
the right rather than by what the right is a right to.”); see also Dwight G. Newman, Theoretical 
Approaches to International Indigenous Rights:  Theorizing Collective Indigenous Rights, 31 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 273, 280–81 (2006) [hereinafter Newman, Theorizing Rights] (“A collective 
right is a right held by a group per se – a collection of persons that one would identify as the 
same group even under some conditions in which some or all of the individual persons in 
the group changed.”).   
45.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).   
46.  Dougherty, supra note 43 at 364; see, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Redefining the Terms of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 685 (1990) (describing how 
indigenous peoples asked multiple international human rights forums “to document the 
massive failures of existing international law to protect their collective rights to survival as 
distinct peoples . . . .”) (emphasis in original).   
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A. Collective and Individual Rights in the Human Context 
1. Two Views on Collective Rights 
Two approaches to collective rights shed light on the issues 
central to collective rights theory.  First, Dwight Newman describes 
collective “moral rights,” i.e., entitlements “whose justification does 
not depend on whether any legal or political system is willing to 
recognize that right.”47  This definition of a moral right derives 
from Joseph Raz’s “interest theory of rights,” which states that a 
right exists if an aspect of an individual’s well-being is a sufficient 
reason for holding another to be under a duty.48  According to 
Newman, if one accepts that individual moral rights exist, then 
collective moral rights necessarily exist “because it is possible to 
identify certain group interests—things that make a group’s or 
community’s life go better, that make the community thrive and 
flourish—that are irreducible to individual interests . . . .”49 
Newman reasons that determining collective rights requires an 
analysis of what collective interests are sufficient to ground others’ 
duties.50 
But Newman, like all collective rights theorists, must confront the 
challenge that recognition of collective rights inherently conflicts 
with individual rights.51  Sticking with the “interest theory of 
rights,” which makes clear that “individual well-being . . . is of 
ultimate concern,” he suggests a constraint that the collective 
interests (which give rise to duties) must also serve the individual 
members’ interests in a general sense.52  He calls this constraint on 
collective interests the “service principle,” acting as “a guide on 
collective rights claims.”53  Therefore, the collective interests that 
 
47.  Dwight G. Newman, Collective Interests and Collective Rights, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 127, 129 
(2004) [hereinafter Newman, Collective Rights]. 
48.  JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 166 (1986); see Newman, Theorizing Rights, 
supra note 44, at 280. 
49.  Newman, Theorizing Rights, supra note 44, at 281. 
50.  Id. at 282.  Under Raz’s theory, however, individual group members’ interests, 
together, ground the right, but the collective right is held jointly by the group, and therefore 
not individually.  Jones, supra note 44, at 360 n.13. 
51.  See, e.g., Jones, supra note 44, at 354 (“Group rights are often articulated as demands 
for group freedom, but they are also feared as vehicles for group oppression.”). 
52.  Newman, Theorizing Rights, supra note 44, at 282. 
53.  Id. at 283.  
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might give rise to rights are always internally related to individual 
interests that give rise to rights.54 
Unlike Newman, who builds up from an individual interest 
theory to collective rights, Ronald Garet narrows in on collective 
rights from the bigger picture.  Garet argues that there are certain 
structures, or “components of human being,” which are necessary 
for human “existence.”55  Along with “the person and the society 
(‘the people’),” two structures of “existence” that the Constitution 
explicitly contemplates as rights holders,56 groups are “one ethical 
constituent of our humanity.”57  According to Garet, because 
groups make possible human existence, group, or collective, rights 
must be recognized and protected when they are implicated in the 
deprivation of human existence.58 
Garet further contends that the Constitution does, in fact, 
recognize and protect group rights.  To Garet, more important 
than the Constitution’s explicit identification of a rights holder 
(“persons” and the “people”) is “the textual recognition of value-
experiences.”59  By “value-experience,” he means a humanly 
experienced good.60  Such goods, or experiences, occur within 
three substructures of existence; persons, groups, and society are 
locations upon which a value-experience “builds its edifices.”61  For 
example, in the context of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise 
clause, religiosity is a value-experience grounded in the person, 
group, and society. Limiting free exercise protections to the 
 
54.  Id. at 285 (referencing Leighton McDonald, Can Collective and Individual Rights 
Coexist?, 22 MELB. U. L. REV. 310, 330 (1998)). 
55.  Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence:  The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 
1001, 1002 (1983) (describing existence as “[t]he human mode of being, compris[ing] the 
self-formative struggle that distinguishes the human world both ontologically and 
ethically.”). 
56.  Id. at 1007 (“The first and fourth amendments ascribe rights to ‘the people,’ and the 
first section of the fourteenth amendment prohibits the unequal protection of ‘any 
person.’”). 
57.  Id. at 1002; see also id. at 1070 (“[G]roupness [is] an unfathomable fact of all of our 
lives.”); Dougherty, supra note 43, at 363 (“As Garet’s reading of [Supreme Court cases 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 235 (1972), and Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 
(1978),] shows, there are some things essential to human beings, like kinship structures and 
socialization processes, that cannot inhere in the individual.”). 
58.  Dougherty, supra note 43, at 361; see also id. at 360 (describing Garet as starting from 
the premise that “[l]aw creates rights that are interpreted in light of creating the conditions 
possible for human existence.”). 
59.  Garet, supra note 55, at 1008. 
60.  Id. at 1008–09. 
61.  Id. at 1009. 
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individual and societal level would not “accommodate the full 
protest against an infringement of free exercise, as that protest 
emerges from the experience of a deprivation of the human.”62  
Therefore, Garet explains, “[a]s a matter of constitutional law, we 
already ‘have’ both individual rights and group rights.”63  The trick 
is to know where to look. 
2. The Historical Arc from Individual to Collective Rights 
Historically, western liberalism sought the “pre-eminent goal of 
protecting the pre-political freedom of the individual member of 
society.”64  Immanuel Kant speaks of rights due to rational agents—
sovereign actors, in terms of making choices—when writing, “Every 
man has a rightful claim to respect from his fellow-men and is 
reciprocally obligated to show respect for every other man.”65  The 
classical liberal interest in the individual formed the basis of the 
framers of the Constitution’s focus on individual rights66—in 
particular, the Bill of Rights was “designed to protect individual 
rights from governmental or factional intrusions.”67  James 
Madison, in particular, is known for his concern with “the violence 
of the faction,” or group, which he believes acts contrary to the 
interest of the state.68  But Madison did not aim to eliminate the 
faction; rather, he sought to control it “because it is an inevitable 
byproduct of something that cannot and should not be eradicated, 
namely, ‘liberty.’”69 
According to some scholars, the Supreme Court has since 
suggested that United States jurisprudence allows for collective 
 
62.  Id. at 1016. 
63.  Id. at 1017–18. 
64.  Jürgen Habermas, Equal Treatment of Cultures and the Limits of Postmodern Liberalism, 13 
J. POL. PHIL. 1, 1 (2005) (describing classic liberalism from Locke to Kant). 
65.  IMMANUEL KANT, The Doctrine of Virtue, in THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 116 (Mary J. 
Gregor trans. 1964) (1797); see Habermas, supra note 64, at 1 (describing Kant’s “Universal 
Principle of Right” as corresponding with the “guarantee of equal individual liberties for 
everyone.”). 
66.  Dougherty, supra note 43, at 357. 
67.  ROBERT COWAN GRADY, RESTORING REAL REPRESENTATION 26 (1993). 
68.  Dougherty, supra note 43, at 357 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (James 
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). 
69.  James S. Liebman & Brandon L. Garrett, Madisonian Equal Protection, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 837, 858 (2004) (quoting Larry D. Kramer, Madison’s Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV. 611, 
632 (1999), for the proposition that for Madison, “[F]action is the fundamental social force 
that needs to be controlled, the very stuff of which society is made.”). 
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rights.70  In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for example, the Court allowed 
Amish families to dodge Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance 
law, because the Amish convinced the Court of “the sincerity of 
their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their 
mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the 
continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their 
religious organization, and the hazards presented” by the school 
attendance law.71  The Court’s focus on “the Amish,” as opposed to 
the individual parties to the litigation, gives credence to Garet’s 
interpretation that Yoder “respects a group right referred back to 
groupness or communality,” and has no justification in individual 
rights or social welfare considerations alone.72  Similarly, the Court 
in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez decided not to interfere with a 
Native American tribe’s decision denying membership in the tribe 
to children of female members who marry outside the tribe.73  
Reasoning that a “tribe’s right to define its own membership for 
tribal purposes has long been recognized as central to its existence 
as an independent political community,” the Court held that “the 
judiciary should not rush to create causes of action that would 
intrude on these delicate matters.”74 
Collective rights are also slowly entering into international law.  
From the early 1980s, indigenous human rights advocates have 
persistently argued for the “collective right to exist as distinct 
peoples with their own cultural identities” before the United 
 
70.  See Frederick M. Gedicks, The Recurring Paradox of Groups in the Liberal State, 2010 
UTAH L. REV. 47, 48 (2010) (explaining how legal historian Mark DeWolfe Howe’s Harvard 
Law Review analysis of the 1952 Supreme Court opinion Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral 
“[b]egan the long and unrequited love affair between legal academics and constitutional 
theories of group rights.”); see, e.g., Garet, supra note 55; Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in 
Higher Education:  Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 581 (2002) (“The 
Supreme Court explicitly has recognized ‘group rights.’”) (citing Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, Santa 
Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49, and Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)). 
71.  Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235. 
72.  Garet, supra note 55, at 1034–35.  To highlight the absence of an individual rights 
argument in the Yoder majority’s opinion, Garet points to Justice Douglas’s dissent, which 
explained that “the idea of an individual right of free choice seems to protect the Amish 
children from their parents, rather than to protect the parents from the state.”  Id. at 1032. 
73.  Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49. 
74.  Id. at 72 n.32; but see Gedicks, supra note 70, at 48-49 (including Santa Clara Pueblo as 
an example of “every time some unguarded Supreme Court language has hinted at the 
existence of group rights, academics have responded with law review articles arguing that the 
Court could, or should, or might, or must confirm such rights in doctrine.  But the Court 
never has.”). 
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Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations.75  In 1990, a 
draft Universal Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(“Draft Declaration”) recognized indigenous group rights to 
maintain and develop “ethnic and cultural characteristics and 
distinct identities through their own traditions, religions, and 
educational systems.”76  Adjudications under other international 
human rights instruments have referred to indigenous rights as 
held collectively.77  Yet into the twenty-first century, “a number of 
major state powers have been resistant to the recognition of 
collective rights.”78  For example, the United Kingdom explicitly 
noted in its vote on the Draft Declaration that “it did not accept the 
concept of collective rights in international law,” and the United 
States, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan all expressed concern 
over the Draft Declaration’s emphasis on collective rights.79 
In short, while political theory and the law have gradually 
increased recognition of collective rights, philosophers and state 
governments retain a concern about the conflict between 
individual and collective rights.80 
3. Against the Grain:  Gun Rights, From the Collective to the 
Individual 
Cutting against the trend towards group rights, the Supreme 
Court’s modern Second Amendment jurisprudence has altered 
 
75.  Williams, supra note 46, at 686. 
76.  Id. at 687-88. 
77.  See Newman, Theorizing Rights, supra note 47, at 275, n.10 (collecting jurisprudence 
under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American 
Convention on Human Rights); e.g., Ogoni case, African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, No. 155/96 (2001), ¶ 40 (finding the African Commission can adjudicate 
the rights of a people as a collective). 
78.  Newman, Theorizing Rights, supra note 47, at 276. 
79.  Newman, supra note 47, at 277–78 (discussing 2006 joint statement of the United 
States, Australia, and New Zealand).  In 2007, the Declaration was adopted by the United 
Nations, with 143 states voting in favor of adoption, and four—Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and the United States—voting against adoption, with eleven abstaining.  United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/IPeoples/Pages/Declaration.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/B32M-JWEA]. 
80.  See Habermas, supra note 64, at 18 (explaining four conflicts arising from the 
introduction of collective rights, including the case where a “leadership cadre uses its 
expanded organizational rights and competencies to stabilize the collective identity of the 
groups, going so far as to violate the individual rights of dissenting members of the group.”); 
Yael Tamir, Against Collective Rights, in RIGHTS, CULTURE, AND THE LAW:  THEMES FROM THE 
LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ 185 (Meyer et al., eds. 2003). 
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who holds the “right to bear arms” in the opposite direction—from 
a collective militia to all individual citizens. 
For decades after 1939, when Justice James McReynolds wrote 
United States v. Miller, the right to keep and bear arms applied only 
to the right to maintain a militia.81  By 1989, the Second 
Amendment was “not at the forefront of constitutional 
discussion.”82  In a law journal article that helped to catalyze 
interest in the Second Amendment, Sanford Levinson suggested 
plausible interpretations of it that gave a right to private ownership 
of guns free of prohibitory regulation.83  Still, whether the Second 
Amendment’s text conferred an individual right to gun ownership, 
or merely a collective right alone, remained an academic debate 
for another two decades.84  The debate moved from the ivory tower 
to the marble courtroom in 2008, where Justice Antonin Scalia, 
along with four other Justices, found, through historical analysis, a 
clear “individual right to use arms for self-defense” in the 
Constitution in District of Columbia v. Heller.85 
Using originalism theory to engage the Second Amendment “on 
a virtually clean analytic slate,”86 the Court performed textual 
 
81.  United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (Second Amendment was enacted 
“[w]ith obvious purpose to assure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of 
[militia] forces”); see, e.g., Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144, 149 (6th Cir. 1971) 
(interpreting and applying Miller). 
82.  Levinson, supra note 39, at 639. 
83.  Id. at 646, 650–51, 654–55. 
84.  Compare David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia:  The Terrifying 
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551, 614 (1991) (“The right to arms belonged to all, but as a 
collective right, a right of the universal militia and not of separate private individuals.”), with 
Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 810 (1998) 
(reading Second Amendment in context with other amendments and early state 
constitutions and finding it “[s]uggests that ‘the right of the people to bear arms’ refers to a 
right of individuals.”).  The debate remained primarily in academia, and not the courtroom.  
Indeed, as Justice Stevens noted in dissent District of Columbia v. Heller, “hundreds of judges” 
and all federal circuit court cases understood, for 60 years, that the 1939 Supreme Court case 
United States v. Miller to “[h]old that the Second Amendment does not protect the right to 
possess and use guns for purely private, civilian purposes.”  District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 638 n.2 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
85.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 603, 636. 
86.  Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. REV. 145, 
148–49 (2008).  Amar argues that the majority’s approach was the right application of “[o]ne 
of the most important and recurring questions of constitutional law:  what to do when case 
law contradicts the Constitution.”  Id. at 160.  As he contends, if Miller was “[b]ased on a 
demonstrably mistaken reading of the Constitution, then repudiation of this mistake is 
rooted in the Constitution itself.”  Id. at 152.  Generalizing the dissent’s reasoning, Amar says 
the Supreme Court would still have to follow a mistaken decision if the mistaken Court was 
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analysis to find the meaning of the Second Amendment for 
“ordinary citizens in the founding generation.”87  Connecting the 
Amendment’s prefatory clause (the necessity of a well-regulated 
militia) with the operative clause (the prohibition on infringing 
upon the right of the people to keep and bear arms), the Court 
determined that an individual citizen’s right to keep and bear arms 
“helped to secure the ideal of a citizen militia.”88  Thus, to do away 
with the previous collective view of the rights inherent in the 
Second Amendment, the Heller majority returned to the original 
source materials—and discovered individual rights.89  In Section III 
below, this Article attempts a similar analysis for the ESA. 
B. Collective and Individual Rights in the Nonhuman Animal 
Context 
In the animal and natural resources fields, collective and 
individual animal interests map onto the distinction between 
“ecological holism” (or “environmentalist”) and “animal rights” 
theories.  As Elizabeth Anderson describes ecological holism, the 
“object of concern is typically an aggregate or system:  a species, an 
ecosystem, the biosphere.  Organisms, from this perspective, are 
fungible, valued for their role in perpetuating the larger unity, but 
individually dispensable.”90  Animal rights theories instead focus on 
the fate of the individual animals themselves.91 
 
fully aware of all the contrary evidence and arguments.  See id. at 154.  This, he contends, has 
no grounding in the Constitution.  Id.  Thus, Justice Scalia was right to write “a constitutional 
opinion that actually dwells on the Constitution itself.”  Id. at 147. 
87.  See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577. 
88.  See id. at 599; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010) (“[I]n 
Heller, we held that individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second 
Amendment right”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
89.  Amar contends that the “new” interpretation in Heller was the proper outcome, but 
for a different reason.  Using the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, he argues that the 
“landmark companion statute to the Fourteenth Amendment,” which declared that the 
constitutional right to bear arms “shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens,” 
indicates that “the ‘bear arms’ phrase was decisively and undeniably severed from the 
military context in a high-profile legal setting.”  Amar, supra note 86, at 176. 
90.  See Elizabeth Anderson, Animal Rights and the Values of Nonhuman Life, in ANIMAL 
RIGHTS:  CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS 277, 278 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. 
Nussbaum eds., 2004); see also SUE DONALDSON & WILL KYMLICKA, ZOOPOLIS:  A POLITICAL 
THEORY OF ANIMAL RIGHTS 3 (2013) (describing ecological holism as “[a]n approach that 
focuses on the health of ecosystems, of which animals are a vital component . . . .”).  
91.  See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 90, at 277; see also DONALDSON & KYMLICKA, supra note 
90, at 1.  Cass Sunstein explains that animal rights advocates “invoke the Kantian idea that 
human beings should be treated as ends, not means—but they extend the idea to animals, so 
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1. Collective Rights for Animals 
Collective rights theorists often begin with the ontological 
question of whether a collective exists.92  Dwight Newman attacks 
this preliminary question:  “if you really do not believe that 
orchestras, football teams, and Aboriginal communities ‘exist’ in 
any sense of the word, you do not need a legal or political 
philosopher so much as a psychiatrist.”93  The answer to whether a 
collective exists is even more obvious in the animal context, where 
individuals have been grouped together even further back than 
Linnaeus.94 
The collective rights of a species are most powerful when the 
species’ survival is implicated.95  For example, biocentrism theory 
contends that species have “intrinsic rights to exist and prosper, 
regardless of their ascribed economic value.”96  But more often, the 
perceived “right” to continued survival of a species arises from 
human interests.97  Humans seek to ensure species survival out of an 
economic interest in the species’ genome and products, out of a 
fear for what could happen should the species go extinct,98 and out 
 
as to challenge a wide range of current practices.”  Sunstein, Introduction to ANIMAL RIGHTS: 
CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 90, at 3, 5.  
92.  See, e.g., Jan Narveson, Collective Rights?, 4 CAN. J.L. & JURIS. 329, 329 (1991). 
93.  Newman, Theorizing Rights, supra note 44, at n.40. 
94.  See CAROLUS LINNAEUS, SYSTEMA NATURAE (2d ed. 1758).  The Endangered Species 
Act refers to multiple collective entities, including “endangered species,” “species,” 
“subspecies,” and “distinct population segments.”  See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(6), (16), 1533 
(2018). 
95.  See supra note 44 and accompanying text.  
96.  Marcia Silva Stanton, Payments for Freshwater Ecosystem Services:  A Framework for Analysis, 
18 HASTINGS W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 189, 232 (2012) (citing Laurence H. Goulder & 
Donald Kennedy, Valuing Ecosystem Services:  Philosophical Bases and Empirical Methods, in 
NATURE’S SERVICES:  SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL ECOSYSTEMS 23, 26 (Gretchen C. 
Daily ed., 1997); see also David W. Ehrenfeld, The Conservation of Non-Resources, 64 AM. 
SCIENTIST 648, 654–55 (1976) (“Existence is the only criterion of the value of parts of Nature, 
and diminution of the number of existing things is the best measure of decrease of what we 
ought to value.  This is, as mentioned, an ancient way of evaluating ‘conservability,’ and by 
rights ought to be named the ‘Noah Principle,’ after the person who was one of the first to 
put it into practice.”). 
97.  See Bryant, supra note 11, at 171 (arguing that “viewing animals as collectivities and as 
units of biodiversity is only marginally more respectful of other life than is viewing animals as 
units of consumption.”).   
98.  Cf., DAVID EHRENFELD, THE ARROGANCE OF HUMANISM 208 (1978) (“[T]here is 
simply no way to tell whether one arbitrarily chosen part of Nature has more ‘value’ than 
another part, so like Noah we do not bother to make the effort.”). 
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of a spiritual interest in heterogeneity,99 to name just a few desires.  
Mann and Plummer contend that these amorphous human 
interests, and not the intrinsic values of animals, ground the 
collective right to continued species survival.100 
2. Moral Complications with Collective Rights 
Like collective rights in the human context, the “ecological 
holism” approach to collective rights for animals presents its own 
complications.  Three are described below. 
First, a rights-oriented focus on the collective can lead to assaults 
on the individual.  Responding to Aldo Leopold’s paean to 
biodiversity, animal rights theorist Tom Regan worries of “the clear 
prospect that the individual may be sacrificed for the greater biotic 
good, in the name of ‘the integrity, stability, and beauty of the 
biotic community.’”101  For an example of this sacrifice, New 
Zealand undertook a violent campaign against individual 
mammalian predators—including massive poison drops—in order 
to bring back the country’s outlandish, unique bird species from 
the edge of oblivion.102  A focus on the species can also create intra-
species friction between the collective and its constituent 
individuals.  “If species are what are to be preserved and they are 
identified with gene pools,” Dale Jamieson argues, “then living, 
 
99.  According to Paul and Anne Ehrlich, biodiversity should be preserved based on the 
“religious” conviction “that our fellow passengers on Spaceship Earth . . . have a right to 
exist.”  PAUL AND ANNE P. EHRLICH, EXTINCTION:  THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE 
DISAPPEARANCE OF SPECIES 48–49 (1981) (emphasis omitted). 
100.  Mann & Plummer explain that “humans do not worry about losing endangered 
species in the same pragmatic way that we might worry about losing our wallets.”  Instead, 
letting a species like the whooping crane go extinct “fills us with a different kind of 
disquiet—a feeling that has led some conservationists to argue that other species have a right 
to exist.”  MANN & PLUMMER, supra note 26, at 134. 
101.  TOM REGAN, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 361 (1983).  Regan concludes, “[I]t is 
difficult to see how the notion of the rights of the individual could find a home within [that] 
view.”  Id.  Some animal rights theorists even see the human interest in healthy ecosystems as 
just another way humans ‘use’ animals.  Assigning value to animals as either components of a 
healthy ecosystem or as the fur on a runway model’s coat both suffer “the same basic 
problem of elevating human interests over those of animals.”  See DONALDSON & KYMLICKA, 
supra note 90, at 4.   
102.  See generally Elizabeth Kolbert, The Big Kill:  New Zealand’s Crusade to Rid Itself of 
Mammals, THE NEW YORKER (Dec. 15, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2014/12/22/big-kill [https://perma.cc/97GK-ESSY].  The Kiwis’ deadly campaign can be 
viewed as either a last stand for certain species’ rights to continued survival, or rather, a 
strain of xenophobia:  “anything with fur and beady little eyes is an invader, brought to the 
country by people,” and the invaders “are eating their way through the native fauna.”  Id. 
WALTZ-MACRO-012720 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2020  5:04 PM 
2020] The “Embarassing” Endangered Species Act 21 
breathing animals can come to be seen as mere means to species 
preservation, dispensable once they have reproduced.”103  Harming 
an individual to further the survival of a species “smacks of 
sacrificing the lower-case gorilla for the upper-case Gorilla” and 
uses animals as “mere vehicles for their genes.”104  Jamieson blames 
this on human values:  this is not so much a conflict between the 
individual animal’s interest and the interest of the species, but rather 
“a conflict between the interest of the animal and the human desire 
to preserve the species.”105 
Second, a species-oriented view sees humans lumping individual 
animals together and, by ignoring the uniqueness of each 
individual, treat the individuals in ways that are not morally 
justified.  For example, in viewing animals through the collective 
lens of species, one can mistakenly assume that all individual 
constituents of the collective are the same:  same interests, same 
pain thresholds, and same capacities.  This overlooks the 
“fascinating question of how individual animals interact in their 
own worlds and why they do so,” and forgets that individual animals 
“may be different from other members of the same or closely 
related species because of genetic or acquired variation.”106  The 
 
103.  Dale Jamieson, Wildlife Conservation and Individual Animal Welfare, in ETHICS ON THE 
ARK, supra note 9, at 69–70 [hereinafter Jamieson, Wildlife Conservation].  In this sense, the 
animals used for species preservation are no different than sows or broiler breeders on 
factory farms, who become “dispensable once they have reproduced” animals for human 
purposes. 
104.  Dale Jamieson, Against Zoos, in MORALITY’S PROGRESS:  ESSAYS ON HUMANS, OTHER 
ANIMALS, AND THE REST OF NATURE 166, 173 (2003) [hereinafter Jamieson, Against Zoos].  
The Copenhagen Zoo’s explanation for killing a two-year-old giraffe named Marius 
exemplifies this criticism.  The zoo defended its decision to shoot Marius, autopsy his body in 
public, and then feed his body parts to lions, because his genes were already “well 
represented” in Europe’s captive giraffe population.  Lori Gruen, Disposable Captives, OXFORD 
U. PRESS BLOG (Apr. 10, 2014) http://blog.oup.com/2014/04/disposable-captives-zoo-
animals-philosophy/ [https://perma.cc/DX3X-YQ6Q].  Lori Gruen questions whether this 
defense aligns with the claimed “species survival” goals of zoos, arguing that “[w]hen 
institutions of captivity promote the idea that some animals are disposable by killing 
‘genetically useless specimens’ like young Marius, they may very well be undermining the 
tenuous conservation claims that are meant to justify their existence.”  Id.   
105.  Jamieson, Wildlife Conservation, supra note 103, at 70 (emphasis added).  Outside of 
‘the human desire’, what interest is left?  Not much, says Jamieson.  “If it is true that we are 
inevitably moving towards a world in which Mountain Gorillas can survive only in zoos, then 
we must ask whether it is really better for them to live in artificial environments of our design 
than not to be born at all.”  Jamieson, Against Zoos, supra note 104 at 173.   
106.  Marc Bekoff & Lori Gruen, Animal Welfare and Individual Characteristics, 3 ETHICS & 
BEHAV. 163, 171 (1993).  To avoid a “tainted view” of “typological thinking about members 
of the same or closely related species,” id., Bekoff and Gruen advocate the “species-neutral 
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species-oriented view can also encourage differential treatment of 
animals based on differences that are not necessarily morally 
relevant.  Thus, even if individual members of separate species have 
nearly identical levels of cognition and sentience (using just two 
traits that rights theorists find morally significant), other 
characteristics like the relevant abundance of the individuals’ 
species, can cause enormously different treatment.107 
Third, a collective rights framework for animals—especially other 
species’ rights to continued survival—presents complications 
because extinction is, well, complicated.  Humans do not yet 
understand extinction sufficiently to react appropriately to species 
depletion and loss.  Only within the last two centuries have humans 
discovered that other species existed and are no longer around, 
while the conceptual label of “extinction” is even younger.108  
Kathryn Schulz posits why we have been slow on the uptake:  “The 
brevity of our lives breeds a kind of temporal parochialism—an 
ignorance of or an indifference to those planetary gears which turn 
more slowly than our own.”109  Yet science still progresses, and 
recently revealed something big and frightening.  Earth is in the 
age of the Anthropocene, as humans are extinguishing species and 
biodiversity at a rapid rate.110  Understanding the Anthropocene, 
and what to do about it, is “the master issue of our time.”111  
Moreover, we are just beginning to think through the meaning and 
value of extinction from the perspective of members of the species 
 
moral individualism” described by James Rachels.  See generally JAMES RACHELS, CREATED 
FROM ANIMALS:  THE MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF DARWINISM (1990).   
107.  See REGAN, supra note 101, at 360 (“If people are encouraged to believe that the 
harm done to animals matters morally only when these animals belong to endangered species, 
then these same people will be encouraged to regard the harm done to other animals as 
morally acceptable.  In this way people may be encouraged to believe that, for example, the 
trapping of plentiful animals raises no serious moral question, whereas the trapping of rare 
animals does.”) (emphasis in original). 
108.  See generally KOLBERT, supra note 33; see also MARK V. BARROW, NATURE’S GHOSTS: 
CONFRONTING EXTINCTION FROM THE AGE OF JEFFERSON TO THE AGE OF ECOLOGY (Univ. 
Chicago Press 2009). 
109.  Kathryn Schulz, The Really Big One, THE NEW YORKER (July 20, 2015), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/07/20/the-really-big-one 
[https://perma.cc/9KVQ-DXEV].  
110.  See generally Kolbert, supra note 33. 
111.  Clive Hamilton, Christophe Bonneuil, & François Gemenne, Thinking the 
Anthropocene, in THE ANTHROPOCENE AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS: RETHINKING 
MODERNITY IN A NEW EPOCH 5 (Hamilton, Bonneuil & Gemenne eds., 2015). 
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that is going extinct.112  Because the “dominant thrust of 
contemporary environmental efforts” is to focus on this global, 
system-wide challenge, “there is an understandable reluctance on 
the part of environmentalists to ‘take rights seriously.’”113 
3. Individual Animal Rights at the Experience Level 
The weight of scholarship on animal rights discusses the rights of 
individual animals.114  Individual rights can take many forms; 
broadly construed, they are protection against harm.  Armed with a 
right, the individual is a small-scale sovereign who can protect 
herself against larger society.115  In this sense, many animals have 
existing rights, and “the idea of animal rights is not terribly 
controversial.”116 
 
112.  Christine M. Korsgaard makes the point that extinction has wildly different 
meanings for humans as compared to other animals:  “[M]any of our own activities would 
make little sense to us if we expected the human species to go extinct in the near term.  But 
none of this is true of the other animals.  Their concerns are even more local. . . . The 
process of going extinct is bad for them.  But extinction—the fact, not the process—itself is 
not, anyway not for that kind of reason.”  CHRISTINE M. KORSGAARD, FELLOW CREATURES: 
OUR OBLIGATIONS TO OTHER ANIMALS 196 (Oxford University Press 2018).  
113.  Regan, THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS, supra note 101, at 362; see also, e.g., Tom 
E.R.B. West, Environmental Justice and International Climate Change Legislation:  A Cosmopolitan 
Perspective, 25 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 143 (2012) (proposing a framework for climate 
change legislation that accounts for individual human rights, while conceding that “non-
human entities are worthy of moral consideration,” but “a defense for their inclusion in this 
context is beyond the scope of this article”); Jonathan Lovvorn, Climate Change Beyond 
Environmentalism Part I:  Intersectional Threats and the Case for Collective Action, 29 GEO. ENV. L. 
REV. 1, 41 (2016) (calling for “animal advocates” to be “more activated by the huge loss of 
wildlife due to climate change”). 
114.  This section uses the term “rights” generally, as a referent for both “moral rights” 
and “legal rights.”  According to Regan, if rights for children create no distinction between 
moral and legal rights, then neither should one exist for animals.  See Tom Regan, The Day 
May Come:  Legal Rights for Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. REV. 11, 21 (2004) (“In the absence of a 
morally relevant difference between these animals and these children, therefore, these 
animals should be viewed as existing as ends in themselves, and as having basic moral rights.  
If the basic moral rights of these children provides a satisfactory basis for establishing their 
legal rights to life and bodily integrity, then the same holds in the case of these animals:  
their basic moral rights provide a satisfactory basis for establishing their legal rights.”). 
115.  STEVEN WISE, RATTLING THE CAGE:  TOWARD LEGAL RIGHTS FOR ANIMALS 53 (Da 
Capo Press 2000) (“Rights are side-constraints or limits or vetoes.  They have a peremptory 
or conclusory sound. And a right that does not stick in the spokes of someone’s wheel is no 
right at all.”) (quoting James F. Childress, The Meaning of the ‘Right to Life, in NATURAL RIGHTS 
AND NATURAL LAW:  THE LEGACY OF GEORGE MASON 126 (Univ. Pub. Assoc. 1987)). 
116.  Sunstein, Introduction to ANIMAL RIGHTS:  CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS, 
supra note 90, at 5.  Sunstein describes many state laws prohibiting torture and cruelty 
against animals as examples of animal rights. 
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This Article calls for interest in one particular form of individual 
rights—animal rights at the experience level of the individual animal.  
The experience level view of animal rights starts from the 
proposition that animals are not simply objects.  They are aware of 
the world, and of what happens to them in it.117  As Regan puts it, 
“Each has a life that fares experientially better or worse for the one 
whose life it is.”118  Through this lens, an individual animal is a 
subject of experiences, i.e., capable of the concept of her own 
continued life.119  This rights theory aligns with the idea of Umwelt, 
a term coined by biologist Jakob von Uexküll, that is intended to 
capture the unique, subjective way each animal lives.120  
Subjecthood grounds the animal’s claim to numerous rights at the 
level of her individual experience:  “[N]ot only against the 
infliction of pain but to the conditions for integrity of 
consciousness and activity, including freedom from boredom, 
freedom to exercise normal capacities, freedom of movement, and 
the right to life.”121 
The experience level is also where Nussbaum grounds rights in 
the “dignity” of an animal.  Under her approach, dignity requires 
that an animal have “a chance to flourish in its own way.”122  
Referencing Aristotle and Karl Marx, Martha Nussbaum contends 
that “there is waste and tragedy when a living creature has the 
 
117.  Regan, Are Zoos Morally Defensible?, in ETHICS ON THE ARK, supra note 9, at 44. 
118.  Id. 
119.  Aaron Simmons, Do Animals Have an Interest in Continued Life? In Defense of a Desire-
Based Approach, 31 ENVTL. ETHICS 375, 379 (2009) (reasoning that animals’ concept of 
themselves as subjects of experiences supports contention that displays of fear and self-
protective behavior in the face of threats is evidence of desire to live). 
120.  Joshua Rothman, The Metamorphosis, THE NEW YORKER 73 (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/05/30/goatman-and-being-a-beast 
[https://perma.cc/7A2W-FK45].  Rothman illustrates the “cognitive and existential as well as 
physical” elements of the term:  “A reindeer’s Umwelt includes forests lit with ultraviolet light.  
An eyeless tick’s includes not just the smell of butyric acid, which wafts from mammalian 
skin, but the years-long wait for a moment of succulent opportunity.”  Id.; see also Steven J. 
Bartlett, Roots of Human Resistance to Animal Rights:  Psychological and Conceptual Blocks, 8 
ANIMAL L. REV. 143, 163 (2002) (“Von Uexküll sought to reconstruct, based upon a careful 
study of physiological evidence, how individual nonhuman animals, ranging upwards in 
complexity from the simple amoeba and paramecium, are conscious of the world in which 
they live.”). 
121.  Anderson, supra note 90, at 278 (referencing animals’ experiential capacities to 
have “propositional attitudes, emotions, will, and an orientation to oneself and one’s 
future.”). 
122.  Martha C. Nussbaum, Beyond “Compassion and Humanity”:  Justice for Nonhuman 
Animals, in ANIMAL RIGHTS 299, 305 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004). 
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innate, or ‘basic,’ capability for some functions that are evaluated 
as important and good, but never gets the opportunity to perform 
those functions.”123  Opportunities for flourishing should align with 
interests that are most important to the individual animals 
themselves, which we can identify according to the “species 
norm.”124  For example, a chimpanzee does not flourish through 
the sign language she learns in a laboratory, but rather when 
allowed to communicate with her community in the way that 
chimpanzees have communicated for ages.125  And a scavenger, like 
a bear, not only requires adequate nutrition but also the chance to 
forage for food.  Even without evidence of psychological suffering, 
an animal deprived of opportunities to exercise healthy species-
typical behaviors is, all else equal, bad for the individual animal.126 
Experience level rights are most tricky in the context of captivity.  
This is because “an interest in not being taken from the wild and 
kept confined is very important for most animals;” therefore, “if 
everything else is equal, we should respect this interest.”127  (The 
 
123.  Id. 
124.  Id. at 310.  
125.  Id.; see Stephen Ross, Captive Chimpanzees, in THE ETHICS OF CAPTIVITY, supra note 
10, at 60 (“Allowing captive chimpanzees to make relevant choices in their environment has 
substantial potential to increase species-typical behavior and positively affect psychological 
well-being.”). 
126.  Anderson, supra note 90, at 283–84.  Anderson contends that the theory of 
“behavioral needs” supports the experience level rights of animals.  Id.  Under behavioral 
needs theory, “animals may need to perform some behavioral patterns for psychological well-
being.”  Robert Young, The Behavioural Requirements of Farm Animals, in ATTITUDES TO 
ANIMALS: VIEWS IN ANIMAL WELFARE 77, 78 (Dolins ed., 1999).  But see Bekoff & Gruen, supra 
note 106 (discussing the risks of overgeneralizing the shared characteristics between 
members of the same or closely related species). 
127.  Jamieson, Against Zoos, supra note 104, at 167.  Gruen grounds this interest in being 
wild in a concept she introduces as “wild dignity,” explaining, “When we project our needs 
and tastes onto [other animals], try to alter or change what they do, and when we prevent 
them from controlling their own lives, we deny them their Wild dignity.” LORI GRUEN, 
ETHICS AND ANIMALS:  AN INTRODUCTION 154–55 (2011).  Norton contends that this respect 
for “wildness” suggests that obligations to an animal derive not from the animal’s 
subjecthood, but rather from the animal’s relationships to humans.  He emphasizes an 
animal’s wildness over her experience.  Otherwise, we would stop a lioness from hunting a 
gazelle just as we stop a housecat from attacking a pet bird—and we don’t.  Norton, supra 
note 9, at 383 (“The morally relevant fact is not usually the content of the experience of an 
individual creature but the context of our interactions with it.”).  Anderson also argues that 
an animal’s relationship to human society matters, with regard to the positive provision of 
rights:  “Two classes of animals have been incorporated into human society:  domesticated 
animals, and captives from the wild (e.g., animals in zoos and marine parks).  The fact of 
incorporation commits their owners or stewards to providing their protection and means of 
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interest is not limited to nonhuman animals; outdoors enthusiast 
humans have joined with animal advocates to sue the federal 
government to “protect a constitutional right to wilderness.”128)  
But what happens if we do not respect an animal’s interest to 
remain wild?  Or if we incarcerate in pursuit of other moral 
goals?129  In such a scenario, Nussbaum suggests a type of 
“paternalism that is highly sensitive to the different forms of 
flourishing that different species pursue.”130  Those keeping captive 
tigers, for example, must consider “the flourishing of tigers and 
what habitat that requires, and then tr[y] hard to create such 
habitats.”131 
Subjecthood and dignity do not solely ground rights claims for 
nonhuman animals; indeed, the two rights concepts have been 
incorporated from human rights discourse by way of analogy.132  In 
contrast to the growing acceptance of collective human rights,133 
the rights of animals have been traditionally protected in the 
collective, through the “ecological holism” interest in sustained 
natural processes.  In 1983, Regan asked, “Were we to show proper 
respect for the rights of individuals who make up the biotic 
community, would not the community be preserved?”134  Below, this 
Article suggests that the Act, properly understood, pursues such a 
course.  A species’ collective right to continued survival as a species 
 
subsistence, since they have no alternative means of providing for themselves.”  Anderson, 
supra note 90, at 284–85. 
128.  Amended Complaint at 6, Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States, 18-cv-1860 (D. 
Or.) (filed Feb. 14, 2019).  The district court dismissed the claims at the end of July 2019, 
with the lawyers announcing an intention to appeal. 
129.  For example, scientists acting with ecological holism intentions are removing frogs 
at risk of extinction in order to preserve frog species.  See Kolbert, supra note 33, at 14 (“I was 
moved by the [frog rescue] team’s dedication, which was the same sort of commitment that 
had gotten the frogs into the ‘frog hotel’ and then had gotten the [El Valle Amphibian 
Conservation Center] up and running, if not entirely completed.  But I couldn’t help also 
feeling that there was also something awfully sad about the painted green hills and the fake 
waterfall.”). 
130.  Nussbaum, supra note 122, at 313. 
131.  Id.; see also Anderson, supra note 90, at 284 (“Bears, who scavenge for food, get 
profoundly bored in zoos, which rarely provide sufficiently complex environments for them 
to fully exercise their foraging skills.”). 
132.  See, e.g., DANIEL A. DOMBROWSKI, BABIES AND BEASTS:  THE ARGUMENT FROM 
MARGINAL CASES 31 (1997) (“[I]f the relevant respects in which certain marginal humans 
possess capacities that merit rights also apply to certain animals, then these animals also 
merit the appropriate rights.”) (describing Regan’s theory of animal rights). 
133.  See supra Section II(A)(2). 
134.  REGAN, supra note 101, at 363 (emphasis in original). 
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is unique to the species, but is supported by its individual members’ 
joint interests in flourishing, as subjects, at the experience level.135  
The Act recognizes these individual interests. 
III. INDIVIDUAL ANIMAL RIGHTS IN THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT 
The Endangered Species Act’s purpose, statutory text, and 
legislative history all contribute to an understanding that, in many 
circumstances, the law protects animal interests at the experience 
level of the individual animal. 
A. Purpose 
The statutory purpose suggests that protections for animals listed 
as endangered or threatened should be broadly construed: 
 
The purposes of [the ESA] are to provide a means whereby the 
ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species 
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for the conservation 
of such endangered species and threatened species, and to take such 
steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties 
and conventions set forth in subsection (a) of this section.136 
 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed to “the broad 
purpose of the ESA” to show the extent of the statute’s reach: 
 
In TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 98 S. Ct. 2279, 57 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1978), 
we described the Act as “the most comprehensive legislation for the 
preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any 
nation.” Id., at 180. Whereas predecessor statutes enacted in 1966 and 
1969 had not contained any sweeping prohibition against the taking 
of endangered species except on federal lands, see id., at 175, the 




135.  Cf. supra notes 44–47 and accompanying text; see also Jones, supra note 44, at 357 
(“Any set of individuals who possess a joint interest in a good can have group rights relating 
to that good provided that their joint interest is sufficiently significant to create duties for 
others.  What unites and identifies a set of individuals as a group for right-holding purposes 
is simply their possessing a shared interest of sufficient moment.”).  A species and its 
individual members’ shared interests in survival give a basis for the duties in the ESA. 
136.  16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018). 
137.  Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 687, 698. 
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The ESA’s purposes highlight why Congress prohibited “take” of 
individual animals.  The prophylactic prohibition on harming 
individuals sought to ensure conservation of the species.138  In Babbitt 
v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, the Supreme 
Court connected the “plain intent of Congress . . . to halt and 
reverse the trend towards species extinction, whatever the cost” 
with “the stated policies of the Act,” as well as its operative 
provisions, especially the “take prohibition” of Section 9.139  The 
Court placed “particular emphasis on the Secretary’s inclusion of 
habitat modification” as a form of “take,” as an essential element of 
species conservation.140 
In addition, Congress recognized that protections for individual 
members of a species are a means for achieving the ESA’s purpose 
of recovering entire ecosystems.  In subsequent legislative history, 
Congress explained that the enacted ESA “recognized that 
individual species should not be viewed in isolation, but must be 
viewed in terms of their relationship to the ecosystem of which they 
form a constituent element.”141  Accordingly, even though “the 
regulatory mechanisms of the Act focus on species that are formally 
listed as endangered or threatened, the purposes and policies of the Act 
are far broader than simply providing for the conservation 
of individual species or individual members of listed species.”142 
Finally, one of the treaties to which the purposes provision refers, 
the Convention on the International Trade of Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”), itself contains anti-animal 
cruelty protections for individual live endangered animals.143  
Because Congress intended for the ESA to “achieve the purposes” 
 
138.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2018) (identifying conservation purpose); id. at § 1538(a)(1) 
(2018) (prohibiting individual take). 
139.  Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 699. 
140.  Id. 
141.  H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 30 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2860, 2871. 
142.  Id. (emphasis added). 
143.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2018); Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora arts. 3–4, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 
[hereinafter “CITES”]; see also Part III.C of this Article. 
WALTZ-MACRO-012720 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2020  5:04 PM 
2020] The “Embarassing” Endangered Species Act 29 
of CITES,144 such anticruelty goals should be imputed to ESA’s 
purpose and steps to accomplish the purpose.145 
B. Operative Text Provisions 
One might contend that the ESA’s broad purpose alone does not 
resolve the scope of the Act’s coverage.146  But if the “Congressional 
findings and declaration of purpose and policy” section does leave 
open the question of whether the Act protects endangered species 
at the individual, experience level of an animal, then the ESA’s 
operative provisions answer it.  This subsection proceeds with the 
Act’s text in its statutory order. 
1. Section 4:  Listing 
The Act’s protections apply to species that the implementing 
agencies list as threatened or endangered.147  FWS and NMFS make 
 
144.  16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2018) (identifying as the “purpose” of the ESA “to take such 
steps as may be appropriate to achieve the purposes of the treaties and conventions set forth 
in subsection (a)”); see id. at § 1531(a)(4)(F) (2018) (citing “CITES”). 
145.  “[T]he rule that statutes in pari materia should be construed together has the 
greatest probative force . . . in the case where the later of two or more statutes relating to the 
same subject matter refers to the earlier.”  United States v. Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234, 
1257 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (citing 2B Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 51:3 (6th ed. 2000) (emphasis omitted)). 
146.  Cheever & Balster, supra note 14, at 368 (“The purpose of the ESA is relatively clear:  
to ‘conserve’ endangered and threatened species. . . . The fate of species as a whole and the 
factors that govern their fate drive application of almost every provision of the ESA.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
147.  The Act defines an endangered species as “any species which is in danger of 
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range,” and a threatened species as 
“any species which is likely to become an endangered species within the foreseeable future 
throughout all or a significant portion of its range.”  16 U.S.C. § 1532(6), (20) (2018).  Fish 
and Wildlife Service (FWS) currently defines “significant portion of its range” as the “general 
geographic area within which that species can be found.”  Final Policy on Interpretation of 
the Phrase “Significant Portion of Its Range,” 79 Fed. Reg. 37,578 (July 1, 2014) (to be 
codified at 50 C.F.R ch. I-II).  More specifically, the agency limits the phrase “to geographic 
areas where specimens are found in the wild.” FWS Final Rule Listing All Chimpanzees as 
Endangered, 80 Fed. Reg. 34,500, 34,502 (June 16, 2015) [“(to be codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 
17) [hereinafter Chimpanzee Final Rule]. 
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determinations for listing a plant or animal “species”148 according 
to threat-based criteria, or “factors.”149 
The listing criteria and statutory definitions for terms in the 
listing provision apply to all members of a species, regardless of 
whether individual members assist in that species’ continued 
existence.  Thus, once FWS or NMFS lists a class—i.e., a distinct 
population segment or an entire species—then all members of the 
class become beneficiaries of the ESA.  Indeed, in reviewing a 
challenge to FWS’s decision to list captive members of antelope 
species at the same endangered status as their wild counterparts, 
Judge Beryl Howell relied on the conservation purposes of the ESA 
to reason that even captive individuals, who cannot further a 
species’ survival in the wild, deserve the Act’s experience level 
protections:  “Rather than ‘undermining’ U.S. efforts at conserving 
the three antelope species, the decision to list them as endangered 
ensures that the FWS can monitor the numbers and care of these 
animals.”150 
Both of the Act’s implementing agencies now agree that the Act 
covers all members of a listed species.  FWS historically split the 
listing status of wild and captive chimpanzees on the reasoning that 
“exempting captive chimpanzees in the United States from the 
general prohibitions [of the ESA] may encourage propagation, 
providing surplus animals and reducing the incentive to remove 
animals from the wild.”151  In response to a 2010 citizen petition, 
FWS reconsidered its reading of the Act, and determined that “the 
language, purpose, operation, and legislative history of the Act, 
 
148.  Under the ESA, “species” also includes a “distinct population segment,” or “DPS.”  
16 U.S.C. § 1532(16) (2018).  A DPS is not further defined and is not a scientific concept, 
leading to “disputes about whether particular populations meet the test.”  Wyman, supra note 
34, at 516. 
149.  Section 4(a) calls for listing “an endangered species or a threatened species because 
of any of the following factors:  (A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or 
curtailment of its habitat or range; (B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, 
scientific, or educational purposes; (C) disease or predation; (D) the inadequacy of existing 
regulatory mechanisms; or (E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued 
existence.”  16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (2018). 
150.  Safari Club Int’l v. Jewell, 960 F. Supp. 2d 17, 68 (D.D.C. 2013) (emphasis added) 
(finding that listing captive members of an endangered species eliminates confusion about 
the status of a particular animal or animal part, which could lead to an increase in illegal 
trade of a species, and discourages captive game ranchers from indiscriminately killing 
species members that are of no economic value). 
151.   Listing All Chimpanzees as Endangered, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,201, 35,203 (proposed 
June 12, 2013) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R pt. 17). 
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when considered together, indicates that Congress did not intend 
for captive specimens of wildlife to be subject to separate status on 
the basis of their captive state.”152  Several commenters during the 
public comment process argued that listing all species members as 
endangered—including captives—would “have little effect on the 
major threats to chimpanzees,” and, thus would not benefit the 
species.153  FWS responded that because the Act applies to all 
members of a species, the “benefits to the species or the effect of 
the listing decision is not relevant to what constitutes a listable 
entity.”154 
Similarly, in 2015, NMFS reversed its previous position 
distinguishing between captive and wild members of a species and 
listed one individual captive orca as endangered.  The orca, named 
Lolita, lives alone in a display tank in Miami, and likely will not 
reproduce again.155  The wild individuals of her species were 
already on the endangered species list.  Even if Lolita can no 
longer pass along her genes, according to NMFS, “the ESA does 
not support the exclusion of captive members from a listing based 
solely on their captive status.”156  NMFS pointed to the statutory 
context of the ESA, reasoning, “specific language in section 9 and 
section 10 of the ESA presumes [captives] inclusion in the listed 
entity,” because “captives are subject to certain exemptions to 
 
152.  Chimpanzee Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 34,522; see also Listing All Chimpanzees as 
Endangered, 78 Fed. Reg. at 35,205 (discussing how the international conventions cited in 
the purposes provision and the operative provisions of the Act do not limit protections “to 
specimens located in the wild.”). 
153.  Chimpanzee Final Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 34,516. 
154.  Id.  
155.  Lolita was three to six years old when she was captured off the coast of Washington 
state in 1970, which would make her 52 to 55 years old at this time of this writing, in 2019.  
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶ 33, People for the Ethical Treatment 
of Animals v. Miami Seaquarium, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 3d 1327 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (No. 1:15-cv-
22692-UU).  Female members of Lolita’s species “stop reproducing at around 50 years old.”  
Ben Mirin, After Menopause, Killer Whale Moms Become Pod Leaders, SMITHSONIAN (Mar. 5, 
2015), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/after-menopause-killer-whale-mom 
s-become-pod-leaders-180954480/?no-ist [https://perma.cc/RG3C-R4QF].  Female killer 
whales continue to live for another forty years, and scientists believe that in this extended 
post-menopausal period the females “go on to become group leaders with valuable survival 
skills.”  Id.  Confined in her tank—or even if Seaquarium released her back into the wild—
Lolita cannot offer skills helping her species survive. 
156.  Lolita Listing Final Rule, supra note 37. 
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section 9.”157  NMFS concluded, “Lolita, [an orca] captured from 
the Southern Resident killer whale population in 1970 who resides 
at the Miami Seaquarium . . . is not excluded from the Southern 
Resident killer whale DPS due to her captive status.”158  In short, 
Lolita was a member of the statutorily protected class, so she 
received the Act’s protections. 
FWS, NMFS, and federal courts now agree that the ESA does not 
distinguish between captive and wild animals of the same species, 
regardless of how the animals’ environments affect an individual 
member’s capacity to benefit the species as a whole.  In other 
words, an individual’s protection under the Act does not turn on its 
contribution to “intergenerational sustainability” or any other 
benefits to the species; rather, the individual’s membership within 
the class is enough.159 
2. Section 7:  Jeopardy 
Once FWS or NMFS lists a species, the Act’s Section 7 applies 
restrictions on federal actions concerning the species.  One 
restriction is that all federal agencies must “insure that any action 
authorized, funded, or carried out [by an agency] is not likely to 
jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or 
threatened species.”160  Agencies considering an action must 
consult with the Act’s implementing agencies—FWS or NMFS—to 
determine whether jeopardy will occur; in the course of this 
consultation, the implementing agency will provide a “Biological 
Opinion” as to the likely effects of the proposed action on the 
species.161  If the Biological Opinion determines that jeopardy is 
likely, then the implementing agency “shall suggest those 
reasonable and prudent alternatives which [it] believes” would 
 
157.  Id. at 7,388 (concluding that “Congress recognized the value of captive holding and 
propagation of listed species held in captivity but intended that such specimens would be protected 
under the ESA, with these activities generally regulated by permit.”) (emphasis added). 
158.  Id. at 7,380. 
159.  Indeed, even in a hypothetical contemplated by Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly of the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, “where an individual wolf had mange or 
some other communicable disease that could ultimately result in the death of other wolves,” 
the provisions of the Act would still apply to the diseased individual wolf.  Humane Soc. of 
U.S. v. Kempthorne, 481 F. Supp. 2d 53, 62–63 (D.D.C. 2006) (emphasis added). 
160.  16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2018) (emphasis added).  This section also requires federal 
agencies to ensure that their actions will not destroy or adversely modify “critical” habitat.  Id. 
161.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A) (2018). 
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avoid jeopardy.162  If the consultation does not find jeopardy likely, 
then FWS or NMFS shall provide a statement that outlines the 
incidental take that might occur, as well as any measures to limit 
the take.163 
Section 7’s jeopardy prohibition is the strongest provision 
supporting the argument that the ESA “provides direct duties to 
animal species,”164 as opposed to individual animals, for at least three 
reasons.  First, the provision provides a “substantive” protection to a 
species that requires the action agency to either mitigate its impacts 
on a species or to decide not to pursue the action, if FWS or NMFS 
finds that the proposed action will cause jeopardy to the species’ 
“continued existence.”165  Second, should the action agency find 
that it must still perform an action “despite harm to a species,” it 
can seek an exemption from the ad hoc Endangered Species 
Committee (informally known as the “God Squad”).166  Because the 
Section 7 exemption sets out a “tough, high-level review process” 
that allows “a species to be extirpated,”167 the God Squad’s species-
based exemption infers that Section 7’s operative provisions further a 
“purpose of species preservation.”168  Third, the availability of an 
“incidental take statement,” which “permits an agency to ‘take’ a 
specific members of the species if the taking is incidental to an 
otherwise lawful activity” when the action will not jeopardize a 
species,169 suggests that Section 7 does not offer individual animal 
protections. 
But in certain situations, Section 7’s jeopardy prohibition can, in 
fact, impose individual protections.  The Act’s implementing 
agencies, as well as courts, have found that Section 7 constrains an 
agency action affecting individual animals in a way that, in turn, 
 
162.  Id. 
163.  See id. 
164.  Kolber, supra note 13, at 177. 
165.  San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Jewell, 747 F.3d 581, 596 (9th Cir. 2014). 
166.  Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Wildlife Trust:  A Reinterpretation of Section 7 of the 
Endangered Species Act, 34 ENVTL. L. 605, 627–28 (2004); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e)–(h). 
167.  Zygmunt J.B. Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter:  An Environmental Law Paradigm 
and its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 805, 813, 828 (1986). 
168.  Jared des Rosiers, Note, The Exemption Process Under the Endangered Species Act:  How 
the “God Squad” Works and Why, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 858 (1991); see United States v. 
Mayo, 705 F.2d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 1983) (“Exceptions to a general prohibition are a legitimate 
means to implement a legislative design and often serve to define the scope of 
the prohibition.”). 
169.  Nat’l Parks Conservation Ass’n v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 46 F. Supp. 3d 1254, 1335 
(M.D. Fla. 2013) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (b)(4)). 
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would have an effect on the survival or recovery of the species.  For 
example, in reviewing the impacts of planned Navy training and 
testing activities in the Pacific Ocean in 2010, NMFS wrote a 
Biological Opinion that recognized, “when individual 
animals would be expected to experience reductions in their 
current or expected future reproductive success, we would also 
expect those reductions to also reduce the abundance, 
reproduction rates, or growth rates . . . of the populations those 
individuals represent.”170  Despite this recognition, NMFS later 
“ignored the effects of individual whale deaths or injuries on the 
survival or recovery of the species,” even though it also found that a 
wide variety of whale species “could be killed or injured (including 
in a manner affecting their ability to reproduce) if struck by Navy 
vessels.”171  The federal district court in Hawaii, persuaded by 
NMFS’s initial reasoning that individual deaths or injuries can 
affect a species, held that NMFS’s subsequent failure to even review 
whether individual whale injuries and deaths jeopardized a species 
was arbitrary and capricious.172 
Thus, when the number of individual members of a species 
reaches a threshold—below which the species may enter a death 
spiral towards extinction—Section 7’s jeopardy prohibitions work 
to protect species members at the individual level.173  At that 
threshold point, Section 7 may actually offer individual species 
members more protections from agency action than would be 
available under Section 9’s prohibition on the “take” of listed 
species, discussed in the following section.  One can easily dream 
 
170.  Conservation Council for Haw. v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 97 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 
1232 (D. Haw. 2015). 
171.  Id. 
172.  Id. at 1233–34 (finding “perplexing” that NMFS recognized that “the death of a 
female of any of the large whale species would result in a reduced reproductive capacity of 
the population or species” but then found “no jeopardy” without further explanation). 
173.  It can be downright impossible to figure out where the population threshold is 
located.  The extinction of the passenger pigeon is a prime example of this difficulty.  
Scientists widely believe that the passenger pigeon “could not sustain itself without a large 
population”; as the species numbers dwindled “they reached some threshold, still large for 
most species,” below which the pigeon spiraled towards extinction.  JOEL GREENBERG, A 
FEATHERED RIVER ACROSS THE SKY: THE PASSENGER PIGEON’S FLIGHT TO EXTINCTION 194–95 
(Bloomsbury USA 2014).  Conservationists often mourn Martha, the last passenger pigeon, 
who died at the Cincinnati Zoo in 1914.  See, e.g., David Wilcove, In Memory of Martha and Her 
Kind, 91 AUDUBON, Sept. 1989 at 52.  But more important to the passenger pigeon, as a 
species, was the unnamed bird whose death or injury brought the pigeon’s numbers below 
its survival threshold. 
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circumstances where agency action does not fit within the 
definition of “take,” but affects individuals in a way that jeopardizes 
the continued existence of the species.174  To give just one 
example, while Section 9 may only prohibit actions that 
proximately cause take (at least in the Fifth Circuit), Section 7 
governs agency actions that have “indirect effects” on listed 
species.175 
3. Section 9:  “Take” 
Section 9 provides protections to individual animals that are 
members of listed species by imposing a duty on “any person” to 
refrain from, inter alia, “tak[ing] any such species within the United 
States.”176  This duty, known as the “‘take’ prohibition,” along with 
its implementing regulations, strongly suggests that the ESA offers 
rights protections for individual animals. 
a. The provision’s take prohibition applies to individual 
members of the species 
According to J.B. Ruhl, Section 9 imposes a powerful and broadly 
applicable “negative behavioral directive” on both private and 
government actors, prohibiting “take” at the “level of individual 
species members.”177  Congress defined “take” in the Act “in the 
broadest possible manner to include every conceivable way in 
which a person can ‘take’ or attempt to ‘take’ any fish or 
 
174.  See Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation, 601 F.3d 1096, 1106 n.4 
(10th Cir. 2010) (“[Section] 9’s protection of endangered and threatened species is not as 
broad as that provided by § 7 because § 9 cannot be enforced ‘until an animal has actually 
been killed or injured.’”) (quoting Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 703).  In his case book, Richard 
Revesz points out that the reverse can also be true—there are circumstances in which an 
agency is liable under Section 9 for take of a listed animal, but has not violated Section 7.  
RICHARD L. REVESZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 967 (Foundation Press 2008) 
(explaining that the take prohibition precludes any “person” from taking an endangered 
species, and the ESA defines “person” to include the officers and other instrumentalities of 
the federal government). 
175.  Compare Arkansas Project v. Shaw, 756 F.3d 801, 817–19 (5th Cir. 2014) (relying on 
Sweet Home to find that proximate cause affixed to plaintiffs’ take claims against the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality) with Citizens for Better Forestry v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Agric., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1094, 1096–97 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (rejecting federal defendants’ 
proximate cause arguments, based on ESA Section 9 case law, in determining that USDA 
“erred in not initiating the [Section 7] consultation process”). 
176.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2018). 
177.  J.B. Ruhl, Is the Endangered Species Act Eco-Pragmatic?, 87 MINN. L. REV. 885, 918–19 
(2003). 
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wildlife.”178  The ESA defines “take” as “to harass, harm, pursue, 
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to 
engage in any such conduct.”179  The definitional language—i.e., 
the prohibited activities—describes action that one generally 
commits against individual animals.180  In a rulemaking defining 
“harm,” one of the terms composing “take,” FWS explained, 
“section 9’s threshold does focus on individual members of a 
protected species.”181  Therefore, the take of even a single member 
of a listed species can give rise to criminal and civil liability.182 
 
178.  S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 7 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2995. 
179.  16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2018). 
180.  Cheever & Balster, supra note 14, at 369.  In addition to making the textual point 
that “take” refers to action done to individuals, Cheever and Balster situate Section 9 within 
the “legal tradition” of federal wildlife law.  Id. at 369–71, 371 n.45 (finding that, because 
Section 9 developed out of wildlife law, there is “no surprise that the language of section 9 
focuses on harm to individual species members”).  Cheever and Balster then lament this 
provenance.  They argue that the ESA’s prohibition on individual take, “without reference to 
the purpose of the statute of which it is a part” (which they contend is solely for the survival 
and recovery of species) would allow courts to “declare themselves helpless to stop an action 
that would drive a species to extinction in a few generations” through the destruction of 
habitat.  Id. at 372.  In short, Cheever and Balster fear that a focus on individual take risks 
courts scaling back the expansive reading of “take” in Sweet Home, which found the 
prohibition to reach conduct indirectly harming populations.  However, can’t “take” reach 
actions that affect either the individual or the collective?  Even if, as the authors conclude, 
“section 9 cannot be limited to protecting individual species members,” id. at 396, it does not 
follow that all “take” must have a significant effect on the species’ population.  The natural 
reading of Section 9, as well as statutory context and legislative history, protects both the 
collective and the individual.  See Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Kempthorne, 481 F. Supp. 2d 53, 
57 (D.D.C. 2006), vacated as moot, 527 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating FWS permit 
authorizing lethal take of 35 wolves because allowing endangered wolves to be killed in an 
attempt to foster social tolerance for wolves ran counter to the ESA’s plain language, intent, 
and legislative history). 
181.  Final Rule, Redefinition of “Harm,” 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,749 (Nov. 1981). 
182.  See, e.g., United States v. Nuesca, 945 F.2d 254 (9th Cir. 1991) (affirming criminal 
convictions under the ESA for take by hunting a single Hawaiian monk seal and two green 
sea turtles); Mausolf v. Babbitt, 125 F.3d 661, 668 (8th Cir. 1997) (reading the ESA, 
consistent with “Congress’s stated purpose to protect wildlife,” to prohibit, under Section 9, 
“any person, including a governmental agency, from ‘taking’ any individual member of a 
threatened or endangered species population.  Under [Sections 7 and 9], the ESA operates 
to protect both the survival of entire populations of endangered or threatened species and 
the survival of individual members of each such species.”) (emphasis added); id. at 670 
(upholding agency decision to limit snowmobiling because “continued disruption of feeding 
activity by snowmobiles could have significant, negative cumulative effects on individual 
wolves”); Loggerhead Turtle , 896 F. Supp. at 1170,1180 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (recognizing that 
the ESA “does not distinguish between a taking of the whole species or only one member of 
the species. Any taking and every taking—even of a single individual of the protected 
species—is prohibited by the Act.”).  Members of non-listed species, in contrast, receive no 
individual protections under the ESA. See Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Skalski, 61 F. Supp. 
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While it is now common understanding that Section 9 creates 
liability for conduct taking individual members of a listed species, 
the question of individual-level protections returns with a 
vengeance when courts consider relief for Section 9 violations.  
Relief is straightforward when the enforcing party is the federal 
government—in addition to injunctions, the United States may 
seek administrative civil penalties or pursue criminal 
prosecution.183  Because civil penalties and criminal prosecution 
are retrospective remedies, the federal government can address 
past activity violating the statute—such as the harm of an individual 
animal.184  In contrast, the remedies for non-federal actors bringing 
citizen suits for Section 9 violations are constrained to injunctive 
relief.185  Some courts have held that, for an injunction to be issued, 
a citizen-suit plaintiff must prove that the challenged conduct risks 
“irreparable harm” to the species.186  But this cannot be right.  As 
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly noted in Humane Society of the United 
States v. Kempthorne, requiring proof of threat to the survival of a 
species in order to secure that the injunctive relief “would stand the 
 
3d 945, 960 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (finding that Forest Service had no further obligations when 
concluding that “a project will have negative impacts on some individual animals, but will not 
result in a trend toward federal listing”); W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 766 F. Supp. 2d 
1095, 1119 (D. Mont. 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ evidence falls even further below the irreparable 
harm standard in this case because the individual animals to be culled are of a non-listed 
species”) (noting Yellowstone bison are not listed under ESA). 
183.  James C. Kilbourne, The Endangered Species Act under the Microscope:  A Closeup Look 
from a Litigator’s Perspective, 21 ENVTL. L. 499, 572–73 (1991) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1640 (2018)).  
Cheever and Balster explain that the Act’s authority for non-injunctive government 
enforcement developed from the “legal tradition” of federal wildlife law.  Cheever & Balster, 
supra note 14, at 370–71. 
184.  Cheever & Balster, supra note 14, at 371. 
185.  Kilbourne, supra note 183, at 572 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2018)). 
186.  See, e.g., Animal Welfare Inst. v. Martin, 623 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding 
that, even assuming the taking of Canada lynx in foothold traps violated the ESA, the Court 
would not enjoin trapping because the plaintiff failed to show species-level harms); Nw. 
Envtl. Def. Ctr. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1315 (D. Or. 2011) 
(“Irreparable harm to ESA-listed species must be measured at the species level.”); Defenders 
of Wildlife v. Salazar, 812 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1210 (D. Mont. 2009) (“[T]he measure of 
irreparable harm is taken in relation to the health of the overall species rather than 
individual members.”) (declining to issue a preliminary injunction, even though plaintiffs 
established likelihood of success on the merits, and that the public interest and balance of 
equities tipped in favor of the plaintiffs).  Property rights advocacy groups, like the Pacific 
Legal Foundation, have pushed for the development of a “species-level” analysis in 
injunction jurisprudence.  See, e.g., Brandon M. Middleton, Restoring Tradition:  The 
Inapplicability of TVA v. Hill’s Endangered Species Act Injunctive Relief Standard to Preliminary 
Injunctive Relief of Non-Federal Actors, 17 MO. ENVTL. L & POL’Y REV. 316 (2010). 
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ESA on its head,” and interfere with the Act’s purpose of species 
recovery.187  A better approach, which both remains true to the ESA 
and fits within a traditional injunction analysis, is to assess 
irreparable harm to the human plaintiffs and not to the wildlife 
beneficiaries.188  Indeed, some courts have in more recent times 
taken this approach, reviewing whether a plaintiff’s irreparable 
harm is human injury “anchored in” impacts to individual 
members of a listed species.189  As of the publication of this article, 
there is no uniform analysis for this question of relief.  Individual 
members of listed species may receive judicial protection from 
Section 9 violations in some circuits, while other circuits only 
enjoin activities affecting the species.190 
b. The take prohibition offers substantive protections at the 
experience level of the individual animal. 
In this subsection, the Article investigates additional substantive 
individual rights conferred by Section 9’s take provision within two 
categories of listed animals:  those living in the wild, and those in 
captivity.  As Elizabeth Anderson writes, “[d]ifferent rights emerge 
in different social contexts.” 191  Section 9 of the ESA and its 
implementing regulations fit this view, according rights to the level 
 
187.  Humane Soc’y of U.S. v. Kempthorne, 481 F. Supp. 2d 53, 69 (D.D.C. 2006), vacated 
as moot, 527 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
188.  See generally, Lutz, supra note 23, at 341–356. 
189.  Elephant Justice Proj. v. Woodland Park Zoological Soc’y, Inc., No. C15-0451-JCC, 
2015 WL 12564233 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2015) (denying preliminary injunction).  See, e.g., 
Kuehl v. Sellner, 161 F. Supp. 3d 678, 718 (N.D. Iowa 2016) (requiring zoo owners to 
transfer the endangered animals away from the zoo—four tigers and three lemurs—to 
“prevent further ‘taking’ in violation of the ESA.”); Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
645 F.3d 978, 996 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding proposed power plant’s effects on Ouachita 
pocketbook mussel would cause the plaintiffs irreparable harm because “in this case 
irreparable harm means harm to the plaintiffs’ specific aesthetic, educational and 
educational interests.”); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 148794, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 28 2011) (“Although Defendants argue that harm 
to the species as a whole is required, Ninth Circuit case law does not support this 
proposition.”) (finding plaintiffs demonstrated irreparable harm based on likelihood of 
death or injury to individual toads, sticklebacks, and trout). 
190.  Lutz, supra note 23, at 335–41 (identifying the court opinions on either side of the 
divide requiring demonstration of injury to individual members or entire species, across 
several circuits). 
191.  Anderson, supra note 90, at 290, 284 (“[W]hen the moral rights in question are 
rights to positive provision, only members of human society can claim them.  This, of course, 
does not exclude all animals from claiming rights to provision.  Two classes of animals have 
been incorporated into human society: domestic animals, and captives from the wild. . . .”). 
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of individual animals’ relationship vis-à-vis human society. FWS 
interprets two statutory definitions of “take”—”harm” and 
“harass”—to provide for different levels of substantive protections 
for ESA-listed animals, depending on whether the animals are wild 
or captive.  This section details how the regulatory interpretations 
are attuned to the experiences of individual animals depending on 
the animals’ social contexts. 
Because of the broad definition of “take,” Section 9 provides 
substantive rights—protections from wrongful conduct—in a 
variety of ways.192  Most obviously, many of the ESA’s definitions of 
“take” protect individual animals’ rights to life and to bodily 
integrity.193 
For wild animals, Section 9 reaches beyond the protection of 
bodily integrity and protection against being killed.  In Sweet Home, 
the Supreme Court upheld the FWS definition of “harm”194 as 
within the scope of Section 9; the agency’s definition included the 
act of “habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or 
injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral 
patterns, including breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”195  Justice 
Scalia dissented, contending that the definition impermissibly 
expanded “take” for the “most important” reason that the 
impairment of breeding patterns “encompasses injury inflicted, not 
only upon individual animals, but on populations of the protected 
species.”196  Justice Sandra O’Connor, in a concurrence, disagreed 
with the dissent’s quick dismissal of the notion that impairment of 
breeding injures living animals, writing:  “by completely preventing 
breeding, it would also injure the individual living bird, in the same 
way that sterilizing the creature injures the individual living 
 
192.  See Wise, supra note 115, at 153 (“[A] right that does not stick in the spokes of 
someone’s wheel is no right at all.”).  See also Symposium:  The Evolving Legal Status of 
Chimpanzees, 9 ANIMAL L. 1, 59-60 (2003) (“I would put it even more dramatically and say that 
rights grow out of wrongs, that the history of rights in the world has been a history of wrongs, 
followed by a recognition that these were wrongs, followed by some inquiry as to how to best 
avoid the recurrence of those wrongs.  The result is rights.”). 
193.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2018) (“hunt,” “shoot,” “wound,” and “kill”). 
194.  Id. (“harm” is itself a statutory definition of “take.”). 
195.  Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 691 (1995) 
(quoting 50 C.F.R. § 17.3).  Applied to certain members of listed bird species, like red-
cockaded woodpecker and northern spotted owl, the FWS harm definition prohibited 
landowners and loggers from altering habitat that housed such animals. 
196.  Id. at 716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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bird.”197  In turn, Justice Scalia responded that constraints on an 
individual’s capacity to breed could only amount to “psychic” harm 
of leaving the world with no offspring, and questioned whether an 
endangered slug “is capable of such painful sentiments.”198 
But the term “harm,” applied to a wild animal, need not be 
limited to a physical / psychic dichotomy.  As Justice O’Connor 
explained, “[b]reeding, feeding, and sheltering are what animals 
do”—interference with such “essential behaviors” in a way that has 
an actual impact suffices for harm.199  “One need not subscribe to 
theories of ‘psychic harm’ to recognize that to make it impossible 
for an animal to reproduce is to impair its most essential physical 
functions and to render that animal, and its genetic material, 
biologically obsolete.”200 
Justice O’Connor’s reasoning might sound familiar, because it 
aligns with a strain of the animal rights discourse, described in 
Section [II.B].201  Building upon the work of philosopher James 
Rachels, Martha Nussbaum advocates for “animal entitlements” 
that allow animals “to flourish in accordance with their 
characteristic forms of life.”202  Nussbaum’s view of providing 
entitlements is the positive flip side of Justice O’Connor’s view of 
 
197.  Id. at 710 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
198.  Id. at 734 n.5 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
199.  Id. at 710 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).  Sweet Home is the Supreme 
Court’s most recent word on Section 9 of the ESA.  Lower courts have understood the case to 
hold that Section 9 prohibits conduct that impairs certain “habits” occurring at the 
experience level of the individual animal.  See, e.g., Defenders of Wildlife v. Martin, No. CV-
05-2480-RHW, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13061, at *25-28 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 2007) (enjoining 
snowmobiling activity within an area because the snowmobiling “significantly impairs the 
feeding and breeding habits of [woodland] caribou”); Loggerhead Turtle, v. Volusia Co., 
Fla., 896 F. Supp. 1170, 1181–82 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (enjoining artificial light from cars driving 
on the beach, which disrupts nesting behavior). 
200.  Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 710 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  In addition, from “the 
perspective of the physiology of the individual animal, Justice O’Connor also demonstrates 
an understanding that individuals can incur harm when they are in more vulnerable 
breeding conditions.”  Adler, supra note 14, at 299.  Her view of take, as applied to animals 
raising their young, fits with what the Interior Solicitor believes Congress meant to restrict: 
the take definition “would allow for example, the Secretary to regulate or prohibit the 
activities of bird-watchers where the effect of those activities might disturb the birds and 
make it difficult for them to hatch or raise their young.”  Endangered and Threatened 
Wildlife and Plants, Proposed Redefinition of Harm, 46 Fed. Reg. 29,491 (proposed June 2, 
1981). 
201.  See supra note 120–121, and accompanying text. 
202.  Martha Nussbaum, Animal Rights:  The Need for a Theoretical Basis, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1506, 1538–39 (2001) (citing JAMES RACHELS, CREATED FROM ANIMALS:  THE MORAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF DARWINISM 129-72 (1st ed.] (1990). 
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the ESA as prohibiting activity that impairs the “essential behaviors” 
of “what animals do.”203 
Section 9 and its implementing regulations also offer what many 
theorists identify as the bedrock right for a wild animal—the right 
to remain in the wilderness.204  The FWS definition of “harass” as 
“annoying [wildlife] to such an extent as to significantly disrupt 
normal behavioral patterns,”205 means that simply placing an 
endangered or threatened animal within an enclosure necessarily 
meets the definition of take.206  FWS has recognized that captivity 
plainly fits within the meaning of harass: 
 
While a permit is not required to possess lawfully acquired listed 
wildlife, one cannot possess it without doing something to it that 
might be construed as harassment under a literal interpretation of 
the present definition, e.g., keep it in confinement, feed it a diet that 
may be artificial, provide medical care, etc.207 
 
But, according to FWS, Congress did not fully prohibit a person 
from possessing endangered and threatened animals; Section 9 
only deems it unlawful for any person to “possess” a member of a 
listed species “taken in violation” of the provision’s take 
prohibition.208  According to the agency, if Congress had intended 
 
203.  Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 710 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
204.  See supra note 126, and accompanying text; see also Carter Dillard, Empathy with 
Animals:  A Litmus Test for Legal Personhood, 19 ANIMAL L. 1 (2012) (proposing “a system that 
calls for particularly other-regarding subjects” in which “[a]nimals could simply exist outside 
of the system, enjoying complete autonomy in the wilderness”) (citing Carter Dillard, The 
Primary Right, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 860, 883 (2012)); Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United 
States, No. 6:18-CV-01860-MC, 2019 WL 3467927 (D. Or. Jul. 31, 2019) (dismissing a lawsuit 
predicated on a constitutional “right to wilderness”) (on appeal to Ninth Circuit).  
205.  50 C.F.R. § 17.3.  “Harass” is one of the terms in the ESA definition of “take.” U.S.C. 
§ 1532(19) (2018). 
206.  See Karen S. Emmerman, Sanctuary, Not Remedy, in for Life:  The Problem of Captivity 
and the Need for Moral Repair, in THE ETHICS OF CAPTIVITY, supra note 10, at 221. (explaining 
the captivity problem that even exists in animal sanctuaries: “[w]e can give the animals more 
space than they had in exploitative captive environments, [but] we can never give them a 
natural life that meets all their species-typical needs”).  In addition, one could read three 
other terms within the definition of “take” to include the activity of keeping live members of 
a listed species in captivity: “trap,” “capture,” and “collect.”  See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2018).  
Neither the ESA nor its implementing regulations defines these terms, and case law 
interpreting the terms is scant. 
207.  Captive-Bred Wildlife Regulation, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,632, 32,637 (proposed June 11, 
1993). 
208.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(D) (2018) (prohibiting possession of species “taken in 
violation of subparagraphs (B) and (C)”). 
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a “comprehensive prohibition on the possession of listed wildlife 
species,” then the Section 9 prohibition on possession “would not 
have been limited to endangered fish or wildlife species taken in 
violation of the ESA.”209  Determining that it is unable to 
categorically ban possession of listed individuals, FWS added an 
exception to the definition of harass to apply to animals kept in 
captivity.  The prohibition on harassment now “exclude[s] normal 
animal husbandry practices such as humane and healthful care 
when applied to [captive] wildlife.”210  FWS creates this exception 
through its regulatory definition of “harass”: 
 
Harass in the definition of “take” in the Act means an intentional or 
negligent act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to 
wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt 
normal behavioral patterns which include, but are not limited to, 
breeding, feeding, or sheltering.  This definition, when applied to 
captive wildlife, does not include generally accepted: 
(1) Animal husbandry practices that meet or exceed the minimum 
standards for facilities and care under the Animal Welfare Act, 
(2) Breeding procedures, or 
(3) Provisions of veterinary care for confining, tranquilizing, or 
anesthetizing, when such practices, procedures, or provisions are not 
likely to result in injury to the wildlife.211 
 
The “harass” regulation language, accordingly, fleshes out the 
ESA’s rights protections for captive members of listed species.212  Its 
 
209.  Captive-Bred Wildlife Regulation, 58 Fed. Reg. 32,632, 32,635 (proposed June 11, 
1993).  One ESA implementing agency appears to have walked back from this statutory 
analysis.  In its decision listing the captive orca Lolita as endangered, NMFS reviewed 
Sections 9 and 10 to conclude the “Congress recognized the value of captive holding and 
propagation of listed species held in captivity but intended that such specimens would be 
protected under the ESA, with these activities generally regulated by permit.”  Lolita Listing 
Final Rule, supra note 37, at 7,388. 
210.  Captive-Bred Wildlife Regulation, 58 Fed. Reg. at 32,637. 
211.  50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (definition of harass in the definition of “take”). 
212.  The definition of “take” also includes “kill,” which, of course, regularly happens to 
captive endangered and threatened animals.  The internationally acclaimed Cincinnati Zoo 
killed Harambe, a 17-year old member of the critically endangered western lowland gorilla 
species, after a 4-year old human wandered into Harambe’s enclosure.  See Michael Gresko, 
Harambe’s Death a Stark Reminder of Zoo Accidents, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (May 30, 2016), 
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/05/harambe-gorillas-zoos-safety-incidents-
animals/ [https://perma.cc/DCM7-9PJV].  But because the federal government is unlikely 
to enforce the take prohibition against a zoo that claims its action was necessary to protect a 
child, and because citizen plaintiffs would find it challenging to prove that killing listed 
animals were likely to repeat at the same zoo—essential to secure injunctive relief—then the 
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operative language prohibits “annoying [the animal] to such an 
extent as to significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns which 
include, but are not limited to, breeding, feeding, or sheltering.”213  
The three non-exhaustive illustrations of “normal behavioral 
patterns”—breeding, feeding, and sheltering—all speak to an 
individual animal’s subjecthood.214  For example, female polar 
bears engage in complex denning decisions based on the unique 
food and weather circumstances of each season;215 rabbits pursue 
forage, groom, build nests, and seek shelter in order to maintain a 
“normal physiological and psychological state.”216  Captivity 
conditions often interfere with—or “significantly disrupt,” in the 
language of the regulation—these individual experiences.217 
FWS does not further define “normal behavioral patterns,” but its 
response to a public comment arguing that it should “consider 
harassment in terms of the normal behavioral patterns of the 
species in the wild rather than in terms of behavior exhibited by 
captive-born specimens” suggests that the agency reads the 
language broadly: 
 
The Service is concerned that persons who legally hold such wildlife 
without a[n ESA] permit, and who provide humane and healthful 
care to their animals, would be held to an impossible standard by the 
 
“kill” form of “take” will likely go unaddressed.  Cf. Animal Welfare Inst. v. Beech Ridge 
Energy LLC, 675 F. Supp. 2d 540, 563 (D. Md. 2009) (“The Court agrees with the standard 
adopted in Marbled Murrelet, and holds that in an action brought under § 9 of the ESA, a 
plaintiff must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the challenged activity is 
reasonably certain to imminently harm, kill, or wound the listed species.”).  Captive animals 
can be continuously “harassed,” whereas animals can be “killed” only once; accordingly, 
Section 9 lawsuits to enjoin harassment are more likely to succeed. 
213.  50 C.F.R. § 17.3. 
214.  See Section II(B)(3), supra. 
215.  Judith E. Koons, Earth Jurisprudence:  The Moral Value of Nature, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 263, 300 (2008). 
216.  Vera Baumans, Environmental Enrichment for Laboratory Rodents and Rabbits:  
Requirements of Rodents, Rabbits, and Research, 46 ILAR J. 162, 163 (2005). 
217.  FWS acknowledged in a proposed rule removing split listing of chimpanzees in 
captivity, “[C]himpanzees need large areas to provide sufficient resources for feeding, 
nesting, and shelter.”  Listing All Chimpanzees as Endangered, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,201, 35215 
(proposed June 12, 2013).  More recently, a federal district court in Iowa applied the harass 
regulation language to a zoo’s solitary housing of lemurs, which are social species.  The court 
accepted expert testimony that lemurs “can express and display emotions, and keeping them 
in a small cage without the opportunity to socialize with other lemurs causes them to suffer.”  
Kuehl v. Sellner, 161 F. Supp. 3d 678, 711 (N.D. Iowa 2016) (holding that “living in relative 
isolation disrupts the lemurs’ normal behavioral patterns” and “constitutes ‘harassment’ and, 
therefore, a ‘taking’ within the meaning of the [Act]”). 
WALTZ-MACRO-012720 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/13/2020  5:04 PM 
44 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW [Vol. 45:1 
concept that holding captive-born animals in captivity constitutes 
harassment simply because their behavior differs from that of wild 
specimens of the same species.218 
 
In other words, FWS accepts “the concept” that captivity alone 
can alter an animal’s normal behavior.219 
But because FWS has also declined to impose a flat ban on 
keeping listed animals in captivity, the agency has decided to 
“exclude proper animal husbandry practices that are not likely to 
result in injury from the prohibition against ‘take.’”220  
Acknowledging that “captive animals can be subjected to improper 
husbandry as well as to harm and other taking activities,” FWS 
narrowly drew the exemption.221  This implies that the captive 
members of listed species retain many of the Act’s experience-level 
protections that apply to wild animals.  As applied to keeping, or 
husbandry of, animals, FWS limited the exemption to “generally 
accepted” practices that would “meet or exceed the minimum 
standards for facilities and care under the Animal Welfare Act.”222 
With the harass prohibition and exemption for captive animals in 
mind, consider this likely-to-occur hypothetical circumstance:  an 
ESA-protected animal that arrives pregnant at a sanctuary with 
complications threatening her life, but also a viable fetus.  To 
 
218.  Captive-Bred Wildlife Regulation, 58 Fed. Reg. at 32,635. 
219.  Gruen grounds the right inherent in this “concept” in dignity: “captivity for humans 
and nonhumans poses significant challenges to the dignity of the captive.”  Lori Gruen, 
Dignity, Captivity, and the Ethics of Sight, in THE ETHICS OF CAPTIVITY, supra note 10, at 244.  To 
Gruen, the “dignity of a captive is enhanced when that individual is provided with 
opportunities for choice about who to spend time with, including captors and observers, but 
crucially, captives must be provided with the ability to escape the gaze of others.”  Id. 
220.  Final Rule, Captive-Bred Wildlife Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,634, 48,636 (Sept. 11, 
1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
221.  Id. 
222.  50 C.F.R. § 17.3.  The definition also exempts “generally accepted” breeding 
procedures and veterinary care that is not likely to result in injury to the animal.  Id.  The 
breeding exemption likely exists to protect and promote the species’ continued existence.  
In a rulemaking that added the exemption language, FWS made clear its intent to encourage 
“responsible breeding” that is specifically designed to help conserve the species involved.  
Captive-bred Wildlife Regulations, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,383, 68,384 (Dec. 27, 1993); see also 
Braverman, supra note 10, at 195 (explaining history of zoo industry breeding practices as 
“control towers for the movement of zoo animals,” intending to create “a sustainable 
population of certain species within zoos”).  On the other hand, one could read the 
breeding exemption, limited only to “generally accepted” practices, as an expression of 
concern for offspring welfare.  In 2003, Jamieson found it “disturbing that zoo curators have 
been largely unaware of the problems caused by inbreeding because adequate breeding and 
health records have not been kept.”  Jamieson, Against Zoos, supra note 104, at 72. 
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which should the attending veterinarian focus her efforts?  On one 
hand, saving the female at the expense of the fetus arguably 
“significantly disrupts . . . normal . . . breeding.”223  On the other 
hand, a focus on the female ensures that she receives “proper 
animal husbandry”—and if the sanctuary does not provide such 
husbandry, it no longer receives the protection of the harass 
exemption for captivity.224 
When confronted with such hypotheticals, courts have grasped 
onto the “minimum standards” of the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”) 
as the key aspect of interpreting the captivity exemption to 
harassment by “disrupting normal behavioral patterns.”225  The 
exemption’s reference to AWA standards reinforces the individual 
rights character of Section 9—as Cass Sunstein notes, the AWA 
“contains a wide range of safeguards against cruelty and 
mistreatment,” and “creates an incipient bill of rights for 
animals.”226  The AWA sets specific standards for housing and care 
of animals; some of these standards are tailored to different 
categories of animals.227  The specificity of the standards is 
workable:  it helps to shape a line dividing between conditions that 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (“USDA”) believes are likely to 
injure animals and those that are not.  (Whether the line the AWA 
standards draw achieves this goal is debatable.)228  In addition, 
 
223.  See 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (harass definition). 
224.  I suspect that most readers would agree that the ESA and its regulations call for the 
veterinarian to first provide care for the pregnant female, at the expense of the fetus—even 
if a focus on first saving the fetus furthers the intergenerational sustainability of the species. 
225.  This comes from the definition of “harass” in 50 C.F.R. § 17.3.  The AWA requires 
certain facilities that possess animals to follow standards for the treatment and care of the 
animals. 
226.  Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1333, 1334 (2000); but see GARY FRANCIONE, The Federal Animal Welfare Act, in ANIMALS, 
PROPERTY, AND THE LAW 185–249 (1995) (arguing that the AWA does not confer rights on 
animals).  Sunstein further argues, “If vigorously enforced, the AWA . . . would prevent a 
wide range of abusive practices.”  Sunstein, supra note 226, at 1334 (blaming weak “real-
world implementation”).  Perhaps the ESA, with its citizen suit provision, offers an 
opportunity for vigorous enforcement. 
227.  E.g., 9 C.F.R. § 3.80 (standards for primary enclosure conditions for nonhuman 
primates); id. at § 3.102 (standards for indoor enclosures for marine mammals); id. at § 3.131 
(standards for sanitation in enclosures for warmblooded animals other than dogs, cats, 
rabbits, hamsters, guinea pigs, nonhuman primates, and marine mammals). 
228.  See Satz, supra note 12, at 75, 83 (describing how the AWA “operate[s] from the 
premise that animals are part of our moral community, though [it] do[es] not protect 
animals accordingly.”); see generally, Collette L. Adkins Giese, Twenty Years Wasted:  Inadequate 
USDA Regulations Fail to Protect Primate Psychological Well-Being, 1 J. ANIMAL L. & ETHICS 221 
(2006). 
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there are fewer problems of proof when reviewing activities against 
the exemption:  Because the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (“APHIS”) inspects facilities licensed under the 
AWA, many facilities are the subject of numerous APHIS inspection 
reports assessing compliance with AWA standards.229 
Two district court decisions in Section 9 “take” lawsuits against 
roadside zoos relied heavily on the AWA exemption, and turned on 
the extent of damaging material in the zoos’ APHIS inspection 
reports.230  While looking to APHIS inspection reports of AWA 
compliance to evaluate the meaning of “harass” does have some 
intuitive and evidentiary appeal, a court that solely relies on the 
reports risks creating overly constraining ESA protections for 
captive animals for at least four reasons.  First, the AWA’s coverage 
is not as expansive as the ESA’s coverage—many listed animals live 
in captivity beyond AWA jurisdiction,231 and not all listed species 
receive AWA protections.232  To state the obvious, APHIS would not 
inspect facilities or animals outside the scope of AWA.  Second, 
APHIS is notorious for neglecting its job of enforcing the AWA—
or, in some cases, even looking the other way.233  Indeed, the USDA 
 
229.  See 9 C.F.R. § 2.126 (2013) (authorizing “[a]ccess and inspection of records and 
property”). 
230.  Compare Kuehl v. Sellner, 161 F. Supp. 3d 678, 713, 718 (N.D. Iowa 2016) (holding 
that inadequate sanitation conditions for lemurs and tigers, and lack of veterinary care for 
tigers, as demonstrated by APHIS inspection reports, amounted to take), with Hill v. Coggins, 
No. 2:13-CV-00047-MR-DLH, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1251190, at *36 (W.D.N.C. Mar. 30, 
2016) (finding that keeping grizzly bears in pits does not amount to take because, inter alia, 
“the USDA has never cited the [defendant] for any violation of the AWA”).  Note, however, 
that the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court on the grounds that it failed to consider 
whether grizzly bear pits are a “generally accepted” animal husbandry practice, which is a 
necessary element of the captive animal exemption to “take.”  See Hill v. Coggins, 867 F.3d 
499, 509–510 (4th Cir. 2017).  In addition, the Kuehl court did find that the isolated housing 
conditions and lack of environmental enrichment for the lemurs at the zoo in Iowa 
amounted to take, without reference to APHIS inspection reports.  Kuehl, 161 F. Supp. 3d at 
710–12. 
231.  The ESA prohibits “any person” from taking a listed animal, while the AWA only 
regulates statutorily designated “facilities,” which include dealers, researchers, and 
exhibitors.  Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2012) (ESA), with 7 U.S.C. §§ 2133, 2136 
(2018).  
232.  In 2002, Senator Jesse Helms pushed through an amendment that specifically 
excluded all rats, mice, and birds from the AWA’s coverage.  Farm Security and Rural 
Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, § 10301, 116 Stat. 491 (2002). 
233.  Karin Brulliard & William Wan, Caged raccoons drooled in 100-degree heat. But federal 
enforcement has faded, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
science/caged-raccoons-drooled-in-100-degree-heat-but-federal-enforcement-has-
faded/2019/08/21/9abf80ec-8793-11e9-a491-25df61c78dc4_story.html?arc404=true 
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itself has found that the Eastern Region of APHIS “is not 
aggressively pursuing enforcement actions against violators of the 
AWA.”234  Third, the cross-reference to AWA standards in an ESA 
regulation presents challenging questions about which 
implementing agency, if any, could receive deference for what 
amounts to “take” at AWA facilities.235 
Fourth, and most importantly, courts should decline to base their 
findings of take of captive listed animals solely on APHIS 
inspection reports, because doing so effectively writes the qualifier 
“generally accepted” out of the harass regulation.236  In many areas 
of captive animal protection, industry has advanced beyond 
outdated AWA standards.237  One large trade association, the 
Association for Zoos & Aquariums, sets its own standards, many of 
 
[https://perma.cc/F8PL-GAWW] (“In interviews with the Washington Post, more than a 
dozen recently departed USDA staffers, including eight veterinarians, said the more lenient 
approach [taken in recent times] has curtailed inspectors’ ability to document violations and 
has put animals at risk.”).  During the Trump administration, APHIS has ramped up two new 
policies that essentially erase observed violations of the AWA:  first, the “teachable moments” 
policy, in which APHIS does not record the violation as such on an inspection report but 
uses the violation to “teach” the facility to do better; and second, a policy in which APHIS 
does not record a violation when the facility “self-reports” the violation before inspectors find 
it.  See U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ANIMAL WELFARE INSPECTION GUIDE 2-6–2-10 (Aug. 2019), 
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_welfare/downloads/Animal-Care-Inspection-Guide.pdf. 
234.  U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT: APHIS ANIMAL CARE 
PROGRAM, INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES, i-ii (Sept. 2005). 
235.  For example, APHIS distinguishes between “direct” and “indirect” violations of 
AWA standards.  See U.S. DEP’T AGRIC. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., AUDIT REPORT 33002-4-SF, 
ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION SERVICE ANIMAL CARE PROGRAM – INSPECTION OF 
PROBLEMATIC DEALERS, 8 (May 2010) (defining a “direct violation” as “one that has a high 
potential for adversely affecting the health of an animal”).  What if APHIS, FWS, and a 
district court all form different positions on the interplay between “indirect” violations and 
falling below “minimum standards for facilities and care” under the AWA? 
236.  See Hill v. Coggins, 867 F.3d 499, 509–10 (4th Cir. 2017).  
237.  See Karin Brulliard, Hillary Clinton Wants You to Know what She Thinks About Animals, 
WASH. POST (May 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
animalia/wp/2016/05/10/hillary-clinton-wants-you-to-know-how-she-feels-about-animals-will-
trump/ [https://perma.cc/2YPA-ATWL] (“The changing public attitudes have helped drive 
some major corporate changes in recent years, as Humane Society president Wayne Pacelle 
argues in his new book, ‘The Humane Economy.’”  For example, “SeaWorld has ended orca 
breeding, and Ringling Bros. has retired its circus elephants.”).  No AWA standards expressly 
prohibit breeding orcas or using elephants in circuses.  For an example of how slowly the 
USDA moves in developing new AWA standards, see 80 Fed. Reg. 24,840, 24,841 (May 1, 
2015), in which the agency decides to consider whether to update its psychological welfare 
standards for nonhuman primates at research facilities, only after the National Institutes of 
Health adopted ethologically appropriate research standards for chimpanzees in research. 
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which are more protective of animals than the AWA.238  Thus, the 
“generally accepted” language in the “harass” definition works as a 
one-way step-up from the AWA minimum standards floor.  As the 
captive wild animal industry outlaws certain husbandry practices 
(likely with a push from consumers), the standard of “generally 
accepted” practices becomes a higher threshold.  In other words, 
the ESA provides endangered and threatened animals more 
substantive protections at the experience level of the individual 
than what are otherwise available under Sunstein’s “incipient bill of 
rights for animals,” the AWA.  Once it becomes “generally 
accepted” that elephants should not perform in circuses, for 
instance, then the ESA’s Section 9 should offer circus elephants 
what Lori Gruen deems crucial for captives:  “the ability to escape 
the gaze of others.”239 
4. Section 10:  Permitting Unlawful Conduct 
Under Section 10, the Act’s implementing agencies “may permit” 
certain activities “otherwise prohibited by [Section 9]” either to 
pursue scientific purposes, to enhance the propagation or survival 
of the affected species, or if the take is “incidental to” otherwise 
lawful activity.240 
The Act’s narrow permission to carry out activity taking 
individual animals underscores congressional interest in protecting 
individual animals.  Each permit must be individualized—the 
applicant must demonstrate why, and how, the human interest 
supersedes individual animal protections.241  Courts will scrutinize 
agency approval of permits for the take of individual animals, and 
reject permit requests that do not sufficiently connect the take 
activity to values the Act found more important than individual 
animal interests.  For example, after explaining that regulated 
 
238.  At trial in Kuehl v. Sellner, one of the plaintiffs’ experts and former director of 
multiple zoos, David Allen, explained that the Association of Zoos & Aquariums standards 
“represent the current thinking and best practices for animal care.”  See Plaintiff’s Post-Trial 
Brief at 2–3 n.1, Kuehl v. Sellner, 161 F. Supp. 3d 678 (N.D. Iowa Dec. 18, 2015) (No.  C14-
02034-JSS). 
239.  GRUEN, supra note 219, at 244. 
240.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2018). 
241.  See Friends of Animals v. Salazar, 626 F. Supp. 2d 102, 115 (D.D.C. 2009) (“[T]he 
text, context, purpose and legislative history of the statute make clear that Congress 
intended permits for the enhancement of propagation or survival of an endangered species 
to be issued on a case-by-case basis following an application and public consideration of that 
application.”).  
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taking is only allowed “in the extraordinary case where population 
pressures within a given ecosystem cannot otherwise be relieved,” 
Judge Kollar-Kotelly rejected as “counterintuitive” and 
“antithetical” to section 10 the FWS authorization to kill 43 wolves 
in order to increase social tolerance for wolves.242 
In addition, section 10 imposes procedural requirements for 
permitting, which may only be waived when the permit is for 
activity that will actually benefit the individual animal.  Section 10(c) 
requires a 30-day notice and comment period for each permit 
application; the agency may only bypass the 30-day period “in an 
emergency situation where the health or life of an endangered 
animal is threatened.”243  Here, Congress made explicit its interest 
in the wellbeing of individual members of listed species. 
C. Legislative History 
In a variety of ways, the legislative history of the Act displays 
congressional intent for protections at the experience level of the 
individual. 
The ESA incorporates an existing international obligation that 
provides anticruelty protection. In the 1973 law, Congress passed 
the ESA pursuant to multiple treaties; the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (“CITES”) was the Act’s guiding international authority.244  
CITES includes a notable form of welfare protection:  Articles III 
and IV of the treaty impose anticruelty obligations on government 
signatories.245  Thus, before an agency implementing the ESA (FWS 
or the National Marine Fisheries Service) may grant a permit to 
export live endangered animals, the agency must ensure that the 
 
242.  Humane Soc’y of the U.S. v. Kempthorne, 481 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2006) 
(citing 16 U.S.C. § 1532(c)) (emphasis in original), vacated as moot, 527 F.3d 181 (D.C. Cir. 
2008); id. at 62–63; see also New England Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 
208 F. Supp. 3d 142, 175–77 (D.D.C. 2016) (lamenting the fact that it could not reach the 
merits on FWS’s permit approvals to export chimpanzees, because the agency only 
conditioned the permit approvals on a promise to donate to general scientific inquiry, with 
no concern for “the intentions of the permittee with respect to the particular animals it seeks 
to access and/or the permittee’s avowed interest in furthering the species as a whole .”). 
243.  16 U.S.C. § 1539(c) (2018). 
244.  See Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (Dec. 28, 1973) 
(explaining the United States pledged itself to CITES).  
245.  CITES supra note 143, Art. III, IV. 
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animals will be “so prepared and shipped as to minimize the risk of 
injury, damage to health or cruel treatment.”246 
Through the take prohibition, Congress intended broad 
protections for individuals, not just for species.  Congress itself 
defined the prohibited “take” “in the broadest possible manner to 
include every conceivable way in which a person can ‘take’ or 
attempt to ‘take’ any fish or wildlife.”247  Such a wide-reaching 
prohibition was appropriate because, as Senator Harrison Williams 
observed during Senate consideration of the ESA, “take” of listed 
individuals was no longer necessary:  “It was once necessary for man 
to hunt wild animals in order to obtain food and clothing.  
However, in today’s industrial society, where there is a synthetic 
substitute for almost anything nature can provide, we are no longer 
dependent on animals, as we once were.”248 
Subsequent legislative history of the 1976 amendments further 
suggests that Congress believed that individual animals’ wellbeing 
was paramount.  Reviewing “occasions during the past year where 
the health or life of an animal on the endangered species list has 
been threatened,” Congress decided to allow implementing 
agencies to expedite a permit for activity that would otherwise 
violate the ESA, but only in circumstances “to protect the health or 
life of the endangered animal itself.”249  Similarly, after explaining 
 
246.  See David Favre, An International Treaty for Animal Welfare, 18 ANIMAL L. 237, 246 
(2012) (“One exception to the lack of concern for the welfare of wildlife is a provision within 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species and Wild Fauna and Flora”) 
(citing CITES Article III, paragraph 2(c) and Article IV, paragraph 2(c)).  Favre continues 
with an observation that the state Parties to CITES “have not explicitly defined what 
constitutes cruel treatment,” and that “attempts to extend this welfare concern to the 
capture and holding of wildlife” in the domestic context “have failed.”  Id.  But perhaps the 
ESA, while not explicitly defining “cruelty,” has imbued the CITES anticruelty intent in its 
Section 9 prohibitions. The text of CITES was agreed to on March 3, 1973, so the 1973 
version of the ESA—i.e., the update of the 1966 and 1969 predecessors—was the first to 
reference CITES and explained that certain violations of CITES would amount to violations 
of the ESA.  Pub. L. 93-205, 87 Stat. at 885, 894 (prohibiting violation of CITES in Section 9).  
The 1973 version of the ESA was also the first to include “harass” and “harm” in the 
definition of “take.”  Compare id. at 885 with Pub. L. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (Oct. 15, 1966).  
These two definitional terms constitute the core of the individual animal rights protections 
in the ESA. See supra Section III(B)(3). 
247.  S. REP. NO. 93-307, at 7 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2995 
(analyzing each section of the ESA). 
248.  Senate Consideration and Passage of S. 1983, Cong. Rec. 375 (July 24, 1973) 
(statement of Sen. Williams).  Senator Williams contended that animals have great “esthetic 
value” and play an integral part in “preserving the delicate balance of nature.”  Id. 
249.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-823, at 9 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1685, 1692 
(Section-by-Section analysis).  
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that sixteen species had been listed since the Act’s passage, 
Representative Leggett proclaimed that “the [take] protections 
against commercial exploration [sic] have been a vital factor in the 
continued survival of hundreds of animals.”250 
In addition, the legislative history also displays congressional 
concern with the ongoing captivity of members of listed species.  As 
Congress observed in its passage of the 1976 amendments, the 1973 
Act was intended “to preserve in their natural ecosystems species of 
animals and plants that are endangered with extinction or 
threatened with endangerment”—captivity was not a preferred 
option.251  Accordingly, Congress only sought to grandfather the 
possession of listed animals that were already in captivity at the 
“effective date” of species protection.  As the 1973 Conference 
Report explains, “The Senate bill restricted the prohibitions of the 
Act so as not to apply them to species held in captivity or in a 
controlled environment as of the date of the enactment; the House 
bill was silent on the subject and hence included such animals.”252  
To smooth out the differences between the two bills: 
 
[T]he conferees rewrote the provision to create an affirmative 
defense with respect to noncommercial activities, permitting a 
qualified person to plead in defense to a charge of violation of the 
Act that the goods or animals themselves were in their hands or 
under control on the effective date of the Act. . . . This section would 
not apply in the case of later born progeny of animals alive at the time of 
enactment.253 
 
While the language of the grandfather clause, Section 9(b), has 
slightly changed since 1973—Congress has added specific language 
regarding raptors and their progeny—Congress has not exempted 
“later born progeny” from the Act’s take prohibitions.254  The 
 
250.  House Consideration and Passage of H.R. 8092, Cong. Rec. 506 (Mar. 15, 1976) 
(statement of Rep. Leggett). 
251.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-887, at  496 (1976) (Background and Need for Legislation).  See 
also Listing All Chimpanzees as Endangered, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,201, 35208 (proposed June 12, 
2013) (“There is no evidence that Congress intended for the agency to use the authority to 
separately list groups of animals that have been artificially separated from other members of 
the species through human removal from the wild and maintenance in a controlled 
environment.”). 
252.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-740, at 452 (1973) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3001, 3005. 
253.  Id. (emphasis added). 
254.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(b) (2018). 
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individual experiences of captive members of endangered and 
threatened species, therefore, were squarely within Congress’ 
intended protections. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
A reframing of ESA protections has many implications for how 
the law should operate.  I offer two suggestions for reform below:  
one for courts and one for agencies. 
Much reform can occur within the judicial system’s analysis of the 
ESA.  The Act’s Section 11 citizen suit provision allows citizen 
plaintiffs to sue both agencies and private defendants for any 
violation of the ESA.255  As a result, federal district courts are often 
the first governmental decision-makers to interpret the Act’s 
statutory and regulatory language and apply it to activities affecting 
individual members of listed species.256  In light of this article’s 
proposed new conception of the ESA, courts should accept a more 
expansive view of “take,” to include activities that create 
experience-level effects for individual animals.  A federal district 
court decision in PETA v. Miami Seaquarium, subsequently affirmed 
by the Eleventh Circuit, highlights why reform is necessary.257  
Dismissing animal protection groups’ Section 9 “take” claim against 
Miami Seaquarium for the facility’s keeping of the orca Lolita in a 
small tank that harmfully exposes her to sunlight, the district court 
interpreted “harm” and “harass” to mean “human conduct that 
amounts to a seizure or is gravely threatening, or has the potential 
to seize or gravely threaten the life of a member of a protected 
species.”258  Thus, the physical and psychological injuries imposed 
by pool design, fellow captive animals, and inappropriate veterinary 
care could not amount to “take”: 
 
255.  See 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). 
256.  See Cheever & Balster, supra note 14, at 370–72 (distinguishing the Act’s Section 9 
take prohibition from the environmental law traditions of the ESA, which rely on “numerous 
agency determinations required to give focus and force to [] prohibitions” on private 
individuals and agencies).  While the citizen suit provision does require plaintiffs to first send 
letters giving notice of intent to sue to the ESA’s relevant implementing agency, see 16 U.S.C. 
§ 1540(g)(2)(B), FWS and NMFS rarely respond to the notice letters, let alone use the notice 
letters to initiate enforcement actions.  See Reed D. Benson, So Much Conflict, Yet So Much in 
Common:  Considering the Similarities between Western Water Law and the Endangered Species Act, 44 
NAT. RES J. 29, 61 n.174 (2004). 
257.  People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Miami Seaquarium, Inc., 189 F. 
Supp. 3d 1327, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2016).  
258.  Id.  
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[W]hile in a literal sense the conditions and injuries of which 
Plaintiffs complain are within the ambit of the ordinary meaning of 
“harm” and “harass,” it cannot be said that they rise to the level of 
grave harm that is required to constitute a “take” by a licensed 
exhibitor under the ESA.259 
 
The court’s analysis and holding does not jive with the ESA’s 
purpose, legislative history, and operative provisions, which provide 
“broad,” experience-level protections for individual species. 
In the administrative sphere, the Act’s implementing agencies 
should stop exempting captivity from “take.”  In a recent 
rulemaking, NMFS concluded that Congress sought to protect 
captive as well as wild members of listed species.260  Yet the FWS 
“harass” definition continues to create a division in protections by 
exempting certain activities towards captive animals that would 
otherwise be harassment.  While activity interfering with essential 
behavioral patterns takes wild animals via the “harm” definition, the 
same interference activity—if it meets the minimum standards of 
the AWA—would not constitute “harassment” of captive animals of 
the same species.  To construe “take” “in the broadest possible 
manner to include every conceivable way in which a person can 
‘take’ or attempt to ‘take’ any fish or wildlife,” and remain 
consistent with its new understanding that the Act does not 
distinguish between wild and captive members of the same listed 
species, FWS should remove the harass exemption from its 
regulations. 
In its 1998 Captive-Bred Wildlife rulemaking, FWS disagreed with 
a comment that claimed the agency could not treat members of the 
same species differently “based on whether the specimen is wild or 
 
259.  Id. at 1355.  The Eleventh Circuit has since lowered this “threshold level of severity” 
to any conduct leading to “serious” harm or the “threat of serious harm.”  People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Miami Seaquarium, Inc., 905 F.3d 1307, 1310 (11th Cir. 
2018).  The Eleventh Circuit also limited its decision to the facts of the orca Lolita:  because 
she had “advanced age” and “cannot be expected to be free of health problems,” the court 
expressed its decision “avoids tying the hands of future courts in cases involving younger, 
healthier animals who may be faced with different circumstances.” Id. at 1308–09. 
260.  See Lolita Listing Final Rule, supra note 37, at 7,388 (analyzing statutory text to 
conclude “that Congress recognized the value of captive holding and propagation of listed 
species held in captivity but intended that such specimens would be protected under the 
ESA, with these activities generally regulated by permit”); id.  (“On its face the ESA does not 
treat captives differently . . . Section 9(a)(1)(A)-(G) of the ESA applies to endangered 
species regardless of their captive status.”). 
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held in captivity.”261  Had Congress intended to apply the same 
definition of “harass” to wild and captive animals, FWS contended, 
“the prohibition on possession in section 9 of the Act would not 
have been limited to endangered species taken in violation of the 
Act.”262  But this reading makes no sense.  If a facility falls below the 
minimum standards of the AWA and “takes” its listed animals, then 
under FWS’s analysis the animals may no longer be “possessed,” 
even if the facility improves its conditions above AWA standards or 
moves the animals to a sanctuary.  Rather, because the word 
“taken” is in past tense,263 Congress more likely meant for the Act’s 
prohibition on possessing “species taken” to qualify restrictions on 
a listed animal’s “dead body or parts thereof.”264  Moreover, it is 
bizarre that FWS uses section 9(a) to discover congressional intent 
to exempt from “take” certain activities keeping animals in 
captivity, when the following subsection, 9(b), is titled, “Species 
held in captivity or controlled environment.”265  Section 9(b) limits 
the exemption from take to “any fish or wildlife which was held in 
captivity or in a controlled environment” before the date of the 
species’ listing.266  Had Congress meant to exempt captivity 
activities from “harass,” it would not have drawn “take” so broadly 
and Section 9(b) so narrowly. 
If FWS declines to remove the harass exemption, the federal 
government should at the very least clarify what the phrase 
“minimum standards of the AWA” means.  The phrase presents a 
number of unanswered questions.  Does any noncompliance 
identified during an inspection by USDA’s APHIS mean the facility 
has fallen below the minimum standards, no matter how large or 
how small?  How does the “minimum standards” language apply 
when a captive animal is living somewhere beyond the jurisdiction 
 
261.  Final Rule, Captive-Bred Wildlife Regulation, 63 Fed. Reg. 48,634, 48,636 (Sept. 11, 
1998) (codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 17). 
262.  Id. at 48,638. 
263.  The other subsections of section 9(a) all use the present tense of “take.”  See 16 
U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (2018). 
264.  See id. § 1532(8) (defining “fish or wildlife”).  Subsequent legislative history 
demonstrates that Congress considered Section 9 to prohibit the trade in animal parts.  In 
1976, there were Congressional attempts to amend the Act to authorize “exemptions to the 
prohibitions on interstate commerce in marine mammal parts.” Pub. L. 94-359, at p. 529 
(July 12, 1976). 
265.  16 U.S.C. § 1538(b) (2018). 
266.  Id. For the exemption to apply, the pre-listing captivity must also be for a non-
commercial activity.  Id. 
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of the AWA, like a private home, or when the USDA has not 
developed standards relevant to the animal, like birds?  Stepping 
back, who even gets to determine what the phrase means:  Should 
FWS receive deference of it interpreted the regulation, or the 
USDA if it issued an interpretation?  May FWS delegate to the 
USDA its authority to interpret what constitutes “take”? 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article contends that the traditional view of the ESA has 
missed the trees for the forest, so to speak.  The key sections of the 
statute—Sections 4, 7, and 9—all demonstrate that the ESA is not 
merely concerned with the collective species, but rather offers 
substantive protections at the experience level of individual 
animals.  A shift towards this new understanding of the ESA, as an 
animal law attuned to the subjective experiences of individual 
members of listed species, should cause courts and agencies to 
recalibrate their application of the ESA to threatened and 
endangered animals kept in captivity. 
 
